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THE WORLD OF TIME AND VARIETY [1]

GEORGE BOAS, PH. D.

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THE great discovery of the modern age is the reality of time and plurality. It is no longer possible to insist that nothing changes and that all is one, for the simple reason that time has been incorporated into physics—in the so-called "four-dimensional" space-time—and plurality recognized by statistics. The Greek believed that both belonged to the realm of appearance and so long as he clung to his logical technique, he could scarcely do otherwise. For his logic was based upon the "essence," an immutable and unified concept appearing undivided in all the individuals subsumed under it. To him the essence alone was capable of justifying even the use of common nouns, and things of which there was no essence—mixed species, monsters, sports—were inexplicable and as good as non-existent. But with the coming of the Renaissance change was too obvious to be denied. Everything was changing: the universe, the earth, the Church, morals, customs, inventions, and the arts. Moreover, they were changing not in a linear fashion, as a sunset changes color, but exploding like a sky-rocket, bursting into a plurality of things, disintegrating if you will: the plurality of worlds, of nations, of races, of religions, of languages arising from the solar sys-

[1] A discussion of *Process and Reality*, by Alfred N. Whitehead, N. Y. (Macmillan), 1929.

tem, Catholic Europe, the children of Adam, the Church Universal, the Latin tongue.

The study of history and biology aided in changing human intellectual habits, and one sees under their influence the old static ideas of Greece becoming submerged and the new dynamic ideas of Renaissance Italy becoming dominant. It was the art of statistical reasoning, however, which made it possible to give an intellectual interpretation to change and plurality and freed us from the necessity of considering time as an inferior grade of reality waiting to be explained away.

But just as time and plurality are the great discovery of modern times, so their absorption into philosophy is our greatest problem. For our old vocabulary and metaphors are incapable of making sense out of them. It has been Mr. Whitehead's task to supply a new equipment to philosophy. And *Process and Reality* is his latest contribution to the subject.

As the very title suggests, the world is no longer to be conceived as a single whole, static in nature, but as something changing, something in passage—process. The ancient way of interpreting process was to seek the underlying substance that did not change and thus deny the very thing whose existence one set out to explain. Because of the dictum, *Ex nihilo nihil fit,* the effect had to be in the cause, and processes were divided into a more or less finely divided series of static stages, internally uniform, like the beads on a necklace. How one grew out of the other was a mystery. For from rest movement could never be deduced, nor change from the static. Mr. Whitehead's procedure is to invert the situation, to accept change as metaphysically fundamental, and to define, if you will, the unchanging as simply a slow rate of change. This inversion had already been made by Bergson (and anticipated by Schelling and the English Platonists) in his derivation of matter from life. And indeed Mr. Whitehead in his preface acknowledges his debt to Bergson, James, and Mr. Dewey (p. vii).

Mr. Whitehead's basic hypothesis about reality necessarily

leads him to a repudiation of the usual conception of " things " as substances with attributes. Things to be extended in time must be " events," " vermiform objects," to adopt a phrase of Mr. Eddington. We are used to vermiform objects in history and biology. We consider a nation to be spread out in time and not to be a substance to which things happen without fundamentally changing it. One of the main contributions of Croce, for instance, to modernity has been his insistence on the fact that a nation *is* its history and does not exist alongside it. The same thing is true about a living being. A living being literally never *is* at any time but is always *becoming,* and it is the whole process which we must consider when we are expressing our thoughts about living beings. This accentuates their growth and looks upon them as twisted strands of many-colored hues, not as a series of unchanging states, an emphasis which is of course quite in keeping with the practise of contemporary physics, as readers of Mr. Eddington will remember. All things are viewed from the biological attitude, and even the eternal hills must be looked upon as temporal processes.

But if that is done, it is clear that the subject-predicate form of expression must be repudiated. When we say, " The man is bald," we can simply mean that at this instant the quality " baldness " appears in that history known as " the man," not that a static substance, " the man," has the quality " baldness." Literally, if Mr. Whitehead were consistent, " baldness " would be simply the name of a certain epoch in the life of one of the strands of the event this-man, the strand of the capillary system. But unfortunately he seems to feel the need of " eternal objects " (which are not different, so far as I can see, from " universals "), which ingress into the vermiform objects. As Mr. Everett W. Hall has recently pointed out (*Journal of Philosophy,* XXVII, 29ff.), they are used by him to provide for the recognition of an item in an event, as class concepts, for over-individual cognition, and common nouns and adjectives. They do the work of abstractions in classical epistemology and

account for possibility and potentiality (*Id.* 31). But one cannot but feel a certain backsliding on Mr. Whitehead's part here. The very metaphors which gave rise to substance and attribute are here used to justify the being of eternal objects, and those metaphors have no place in this system of thought. I refer to the physical metaphor of a quality's " coming out of " a previous state, and of the quality's being a static lump, subject to the law of the conservation of matter, appearing here, there, everywhere, without loss, increment, or change.

We must not lapse into criticism, however, but proceed to the next point in our exposition. That is how the various events get twisted together and cohere instead of lying parallel to one another, so to speak. A living being, for instance, has a kind of functional integration which subordinates the diversity of his parts to the activity of the whole, and though there is occasional rebellion—as in cancer—or functional nullification —as in paralysis—there is in general a curious solidarity of all, which has of course been the wonder of centuries. The fact of sticking together is called by Mr. Whitehead a " nexus," and the means by which things stick together is " prehension." This term, which like so much of Mr. Whitehead's vocabulary is biological, indicates something which has three factors, (*a*) the subject which is prehending, (*b*) the datum prehended, and (*c*) the subjective form or manner in which the datum is prehended. But in spite of the biological connotation of these words, prehensions do not necessarily involve consciousness, but will be found in inanimate subjects as well as animate.

Mr. Whitehead relies largely on this doctrine to avoid what he calls " the bifurcation of nature " into two separate and entirely different realms of matter and mind. This bifurcation, which arises first in common sense, was justified in philosophy by the metaphysics of Galileo. Galileo in brief looked for that minimum of properties which would explain (or define) the motion of material objects and found them in what later became the primary qualities of Locke. By an easy and natural

enough step, he argued that as these properties were general to all matter, regardless of whatever other properties matter might have, they must be essential. Since an object's essence has a " deeper " sort of reality than its accidents, it was simple to infer that matter " really " was as described in physics and only apparently as described in psychology. For the perceptual and other psychological properties are not omnipresent at all, but appear only here and there and therefore are not necessary (i. e., essential) to matter. Yet they are always present in any actual bit of matter that we meet, and as our experience is always specific and never general—except possibly in conception —we never do experience the matter of the physicist. Why then start with the assumption that reality is something transcending rather than immanent in experience?

The reason the seventeenth century would have made is that we want a mathematical account of things and *more geometrico* we cannot discuss the specific. The mathematics of Mr. Whitehead is not perhaps so limited, and there is some question whether it is not able to handle time and plurality without denying them. Certainly the technique of statistics, while not without problems of its own, can handle change and plurality and that without the peculiar difficulties of the Platonic theory of essences. Mr. Dewey, as a matter of fact, seems to understand this, but Mr. Whitehead is not quite so clear about it. That is one of the reasons why he still clings to the doctrine of " eternal objects," which after all gives him a bifurcation of nature quite as irreconcilable as that between mind and matter.

There is no *a posteriori* evidence that the various series of events completely prehend each other, but Mr. Whitehead seems to feel that there must be an organic unity to the universe, so that its history may form a single event. But since events develop from potentiality into actuality, and since potentiality to Mr. Whitehead demands an eternal object—analogous to the Platonic-Aristotelian " form "—to become actual, the unity of the universe is expressed in the apparent antithesis, God-World,

whose separation is verbal rather than real. God, for Mr. Whitehead (p. 374), "is that actual entity from which each temporal concrescence receives that initial aim from which its self-causation starts," which means, I suppose, that God is all possible potentialities which—this is the natural assumption of a logician—have an organic unity. Whether such a God will answer our religious needs, I shall not venture to affirm or to deny. Readers of this magazine are more qualified in such matters than I. But certainly such a God looks highly different from the God of the Hebraic-Christian tradition, and it is a grave question whether one could pray to Him or worship Him. Yet it must be admitted that this brief discussion of *Process and Reality* may have completely misunderstood the book. For any one who has tried to assimilate its strange vocabulary will confess that it is very easy to misunderstand. And even if it has been understood, little more than a first cursory glance has been given it here. Which is enough for our purposes but not enough to do justice to its originality and power.

BEING UNDERSTOOD AS A SPEAKER OR WRITER

CHARLES LUTHER WILLIAMS
Denison University

A TEACHER of English literature in one of our Ohio colleges during the course of a talk he gave his class on Robert Browning told them Browning was the favorite poet of many highly intellectual and cultured people. He also told the members of his class that on the other hand many intelligent people and lovers of good literature did not enjoy much of Browning's poetry because of its obscurity, because they often could not be sure as to the full meaning of it. In this connection the teacher quoted what James Russell Lowell once remarked to Moncure D. Conway, "I own a copy of Browning's poem called 'Sordello' and I will give it to any man who will put his hand on his heart and solemnly declare he understands the poem."

At this point a member of the class, a young man who never seemed to have much of importance going on in his head, raised his hand indicating he had something he wished to say and this is what he said: "Excuse me, sir, but I never found anything obscure in 'Sordello.' The first time I read it, I was just carried away with it." The young man did not say where he had been carried to, or how long it took him to get back. Indeed, it was not certain he was all back at the time.

There you have it. The less some persons understand a thing the better they like it and the louder they are in their praise of it. It now and then happens that a man gives an address on a subject of which he has only a hazy knowledge. He does not have a clear idea of what he is talking about, nor, of course, do they who are listening to him. After the address is ended, a few of those who have heard it feeling they ought to say something complimentary about it, describe it as "just

wonderful because it was so profound, so deep"—as if anybody can tell how deep muddy water is merely by looking at it!

It is well for a speaker to take all the compliments he receives from such well-meaning but effervescent persons, add the compliments together, divide them by about ten, and even then not set too great a store by the quotient.

On the first day of April you may receive through the mail a good-sized package, which has been duly registered. Not remembering that it is April Fool Day you may think the package contains something of real value but after you have removed many different wrappers and have come to what they enclose, you find that beside the wrappings the package contains only a peanut—we will say. You have been fooled.

Likewise there is now and then a public speaker who is an expert in rolling out lifeless platitudes so extravagantly clothed in words and delivered in a voice so loud-sounding that some people not knowing what else to say about his performance are fooled into calling it "eloquent."

We used to be told that a word was the sign of an idea, but what ideas some words are signs of is occasionally hard for us to make out. We used to be told also that if a speaker wanted to be easily understood, he must use mostly short, every-day words; but we learned long ago that a speaker without any special effort may be as obscure in the use of short, every-day words as he can be in using a great multitude of swollen and long-tailed words. In either case we are hardly able to see his ideas on account of his words. His ideas appear to be drowned in words, and we have to fish them out as we would fish out of the mill-pond a boy who has gone under the water for the third time.

Some of us feel that in a few respects George Eliot was the greatest of the English novelists, although, of course, she had her faults. For one thing, she was very severely moral as if she were in a pulpit preaching much of the time. Besides,

in her later novels she appeared to be afflicted with words. To illustrate.

In *Middlemarch,* her longest novel and her last but one, speaking of the young and ardent Miss Dorothea Brooke who looks with favor on that elderly, that wintry creature Rev. Edward Casaubon and finally marries him, George Eliot, in apparent seriousness, asks this question: "Has anyone ever pinched into its pilulous smallness the cobweb of prematrimonial acquaintanceship?" Can any one who is kind enough to read this article answer that question?

As a general rule, a real man, a man of good sense, is more than willing to make himself easily understood. Besides, he would no more refrain from doing this through fear of being considered commonplace than for this reason he would refrain from taking a bath when he needs one. He may be sure that if he says in his own honest way what may have been said many times before and that if he says it so others may easily and gladly grasp his meaning, it is not likely he will be thought commonplace by those people whose favorable opinion is most worth having.

Everything that went into the make-up of a rose-bush in full bloom was just as commonplace at one time as everything in the make-up of a stone wall. The difference between the two is that the rose-bush, being alive, has changed the commonplace into the uncommon.

In the early part of the seventeenth century there was a school of English poets whom Samuel Johnson in his essay on Cowley called the "metaphysical poets," but who have been more properly called the "fantastic poets." One of their chief aims was to avoid the commonplace, and how well one of them achieved this aim may be seen in the following lines:

> By every wind that comes this way
> Send me at least a sigh or two.
> Such, and so many I'll repay
> As shall themselves make wings to get to you.

The kind of ability most fundamental in the equipment of a speaker is intelligibility—if a pun may be allowed. If he is not intelligible, he cannot be really forcible, elegant, or anything else worth while in point of style, because qualities of style are first of all qualities of thought. Clear speech comes directly from clear thought, and nebulous thinking can issue only in nebulous speaking. A well-meaning preacher once gave a sermon, an alleged sermon, on the topic " The Eternal Now." If he were living today, he might gain admission to the beatific circle of the Intelligentsia.

The chief reason people can so easily understand a speaker is that he so fully understands what he wished to say and what he is saying, and therefore, the use of all grammatical expedients and all rhetorical devices, such as apt similes, striking metaphors, sharp antitheses, and bold hyperboles, is justified mainly on the ground that they help the speaker to make himself clearly understood and thus to economize the attention of his hearers, as Mr. Herbert Spencer maintained in his famous essay on the Philosophy of Style.

It has never been my privilege to hear Dr. Charles Edward Jefferson, for so long the honored pastor of the Broadway Tabernacle in New York, but I have read just about all the books he has published, and it has always seemed to me that, more than many other writers on religious subjects, he has the knack of economizing the attention of his readers. He has the fine art of parting with his fruitful ideas and at the same time of imparting them to his readers in a way delightfully free from anything calculated to produce mental weariness.

The English Bible economizes the attention of its readers more than any other important book in the world, and the reason for this resides in the fact that the diction of the English Bible is ideal. This is particularly true of the Authorized or King James version, whatever may be said as to the correctness of the translation in some places; and no speaker will employ hazy, lifeless, or uncouth English whose style has

been formed under the influence of the English Bible, as was true of men so widely apart in some respects as Abraham Lincoln and John Ruskin. Why is this?

The diction of the Authorized version is as clear as the most transparent window glass. It is direct, it does not beat about the bush. There are no dodging circumlocutions, no softly padded euphemisms. If a man has lied, the English Bible does not speak in a mincing way of what he has done. It calls him a liar, and lets the matter go at that. The diction of the English Bible is as natural as the smile of a babe or the song of a canary, for those who made the Authorized version were too serious to indulge in literary vanity of any sort.

More than this, the diction of this version is concrete, and paraphrase only mutilates the simplicity and beauty of it, as the following paraphrase of Luke 12: 17, made in all seriousness by a Doctor Campbell, will clearly show: "Consider the flowers, how they gradually increase in their size. They do no sort of work, and yet I declare that no king whatever in his most splendid regalia is dressed up in such fine clothes."

The original is vivid and picturesque. The paraphrase is anything but that, because for one thing, general terms such as "flowers" have been put in the place of specific terms such as "lilies." Trying to add whiteness to snow which is just from the sky would be attempting a work of supererogation.

It is not in the least discreditable but entirely to the credit of a speaker for him to make himself clearly and easily understood by the average hearer. If the less intelligent in his audience can understand him because he does this, well and good; and if the more intelligent do not understand him, it is their own fault, and so much the worse for them.

Away back about the middle of the last century the professor of theology in the Princeton Theological Seminary was Dr. Archibald Alexander. He was a tower of strength for his scholarship and for his valiant piety. He was the author

of a widely used work on *The Evidences of the Christian Religion.* Besides, although a very old man, he would go out on Sunday afternoons in the summertime to preach in a rural church near Princeton. One Sunday being unable to go he sent a student of his who preached in his place. After the services were over, so it has been reported, an honest old farmer who had heard the young man preach, was asked how he liked the sermon, and he quietly replied: "Well, to tell the truth, I didn't like it altogether because there was so much of it I couldn't make anything of. I like that old gentleman that's been a comin' here to preach. He don't know so much. I can make out everything he says." Could any higher compliment have been paid to Doctor Alexander's preaching?

Of our Lord it is said, "The common people heard him gladly." No doubt, one reason for that was they could easily understand him.

GOD, THE HOLY SPIRIT

OWEN PHILIPS EACHES

THE Bible starts with the existence of a personal Lord, the impersonal Lord being of no use in an intelligent universe. The Old Testament opens with the words "In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth." John's Gospel also starts with the personal God, a Creator of all things. He reveals God as making not things but men with intelligence, mind, vision, in a thinking universe. There is revealed at the beginning of things a Mind God at the head of the universe. It is a hopeful outlook for the world that amid the darkness the light shone but the darkness did not master it. God had thoughts of mercy and redemption in mind. There was a planned creation and spiritual life, an intrusion into the world of a personal God, ministering to the welfare of men. God had in mind an incarnation, a coming in personal form of a being from heaven who would show thereby his interest in men and reveal himself to men as a real Lord, opening his heart to them, a God who could be "touched." Before Christ, God was manifested in the relation of love to the Hebrew people. In this relation much of what is fundamental to a right knowledge of God comes into view. He became known as the holy, gracious, and forgiving God to whom all penitent people might come and find forgiveness. The revelation was thus gradual and progressive, and the conception of God in Old Testament times was therefore always partial and imperfect. The manifestations of God in pre-Christian days were, however, of such a character that men might know and many did know the living God of all as personal, holy, and merciful. There were holy men before Christ—Abraham, Isaiah, Joel. There were also seekers after God, walking in the dark, hoping they might find the light, men like Socrates and Melchizedek outside the chosen people. The God thus manifested was in every sense one,

looked at simply as God, with no internal distinctions being attributed to him and no clear distinctions being found in him. There is neither trinity or tri-unity in the Old Testament. That comes with the clearer light of the New Testament.

When Christ came, there was in the revelation of his person, in his teachings, and especially in his character, a new and richer manifestation of God. God was now revealed as he had never been before. Standing before his disciples, he said, " He that hath seen me hath seen [God himself] the Father." Jesus took people into the Holy of Holies and showed to men the real character of God. There were three outstanding events in the New Testament on which Christianity rests as foundation-stones. If they pass out of the confines of certainty, everything in revelation and of historical Christianity goes with them. These are the Incarnation, the Resurrection of Christ, and the coming and growing of the Holy Spirit. On the tenth day of June, A. D. 30, there was celebrated in Jerusalem the feast of Pentecost. This was an Old Testament feast portrayed in Leviticus 23: 7. Everything about the day was quiet, with no stir in the city. It was an ordinary day of worship with nothing to indicate that this day was other than a day of commonplace interest. When the drums beat for Waterloo, there was nothing to indicate that it could be a day of world-significance. In like manner, this day in June was not looked upon as a day of vast moral significance in God's mediatorial work, a day showing the personal God's intrusion into a great movement having in view a revolution on God's method of working.

I. *Pentecost is a time calling for a new appreciation* of Jesus, of his person, his work, his revelation of God's work in the world. The one man of great significance at Pentecost was Peter the apostle. He occupied the center of the stage. He was the chief, almost the only speaker. The one man of whom he spoke was Jesus. Until the last few weeks, Jesus had been their leader—he was the first, there was no second. He filled

the place of God's vice-gerent in the world. They called him Son of God. They reverenced him as divine, they prayed to him. They heard him say, "I and My Father are one." He said: "I came from God. I am spokesman for God. I go to God." They had heard God's will at the Jordan: "This is my Son, my Beloved in whom is my delight." They heard him say to Lazarus, "Lazarus, come forth!" And the dead man became living. They heard him say, "Thy sins are forgiven thee," claiming power that belonged to God alone. Two months before this day, he was living among them; ten days before this day, he went up into the skies. Pilate the Governor said he sentenced him to death and a burial in a safe guarded grave. Rome and Pilate said, "We do not know who he is or what became of him." Peter and James and John and a score of others said, "We testify that we knew him living, and saw him when dead, and spoke to him after he came into life again." Jesus testified to his going into death, his residence in the land of death. Then for forty days, he lived with his disciples. He continually spoke of a continued life, of a Kingdom to be entered into, of a personal fellowship and watchcare. Peter gives an outline of the last days of his life among them, of his death; claimed in their presence that God raised him from the dead. In the very place where Jesus lived, within a few feet of his burial-place, among people who knew him, Peter spoke of Jesus whom he knew personally until ten days before as still living. Peter staked everything on his belief in Jesus, his historical character, the truthfulness of his words. If he failed them, everything was gone. They followed him in the way, if he went into nothingness or uncertainty they were all going into the dark. Peter assured them of the reality of Jesus' claims, he gives the authentic records of his life, he puts certainty under the testimony of Christ.

Where is Jesus on that morning? Peter answers: "He is at God's right hand. He went into heaven after angels, authorities, and powers had been made subject to him." Jesus

lived his life and then he lived on. He said in his closing address in John 16, " I shall continue to live and live in a larger way than when I was with you." He did not leave his disciples in the lurch, giving up his work in leaving them. No words can more fully describe what the Holy Spirit can do in them, for them, with them, through them. " He will be everything that I have been to you," and then Jesus adds, " Greater things will be done than I have done or been able to do for you." Jesus was restrained from doing his best because as the writer says in John 7: 39, the Son of Man was not yet glorified and therefore could not be of his best service in helping Jesus in his work. Jesus entered into the glorified life ten days before the Pentecostal days, and then he asked the Father for the presence of the Holy Spirit. Jesus went to heaven from the earth, and then the Holy Spirit came from heaven to the earth. They acted jointly for Christ and the truth.

From this time unfolds a new plan of operation, with and for men; the Holy Spirit will be his agent to make known his will. The one God of all known to the fathers had manifested himself in the divine-human Christ, and now in the invisible spirit of truth and life was present, really with them. Both were his agents and each was truly himself and truly divine. The divine Son had been among them, the divine Spirit dwelt in them, and, by both, the divine Father was made real to them. Thus was the Trinity very actual and very real to them. In that first coming at Pentecost, there was the outward sound, the sign of the tongue, symbol of God's speech. There was almost no place for miracles. The Holy Spirit worked quietly in their hearts and their wills, clarifying their judgments, leading to right decisions for God and spiritual realities. The disciples had been spiritually prepared for this spiritual vision through Jesus' words, through God's prophecy describing it, through Peter's interpretation of the prophecy. God was working out through the Spirit the meaning for their own lives. Pentecost had begun, it did not end that day. It was meant to introduce

a new spiritual era, embracing that year and a thousand years to come.

It is a great mistake when we make Pentecost simply a date, an event on the calendar. It is rather the opening of an era, a great spiritual dispensation, a movement begotten by a personal God at work in the world today. It is not to be limited to the Apostles as such nor to that age. Pentecost is meant to be thought of as the inauguration of Pentecostal times, not of a Pentecostal day. It is common in theology to speak of the Holy Spirit as the third person of the Trinity. We cannot think of Peter speaking in this way. Before there was any recognition of three in one, there was a knowledge of God's dealing with the world, with the person and mission of Christ and of his dealing with the human soul. One of the completest definitions of the Holy Spirit is one given by Jesus himself in declaring that the Holy Spirit, like himself, was a Paraclete, a Greek term meaning a friend standing by oneself, or a helper. Jesus was a real helper to his disciples, he interpreted their every need. The Holy Spirit is not a thing but a person, not an atmosphere or a principle but one with character, a person who thinks and plans, an executive who can do things. He took the place of the Twelve carrying on the work of establishing divinity. Christ spent a large part of his time in training the Twelve to carry on his work. He took a like deep interest in his preparing for and planning for the Holy Spirit's work after his departure.

II. *Pentecost is a time for a new conception of the person, the work, the power of the Holy Spirit.* Jesus gives the new order of the work of the Holy Spirit in his talk with Nicodemus: "Ye must be born again." It is universal and irrepealable. It is found in glimpses in the Old Testament, it is found in an enlarged way in the New Testament. At Athens in Greece, five hundred and fifty years B. C., such a group of geniuses as the world has never seen before was found—poets, dramatists, sculptors, painters, generals, statesmen, philoso-

phers. At the feast of Pentecost, the Lord God of all the earth had, with a group of lowly men, introduced a movement among men whose influence would be for holiness and righteousness, for establishing a church whose aim would be to make God's reign come in the earth. Oftentimes, in its course among men, it might happen that it might be led astray in unspiritual ways, leading to distorted notions about baptism, the Supper, ritual observances, wordly conformity, grievous defection from true teaching, such as met the Galatian churches. Through the Spirit's direct influence upon the church, through the guidance of the Spirit in his knowledge of the times, through the light of the New Testament in bringing the words of Christ to the mind, we may keep the church largely without spot and blameless. The Holy Spirit is set apart to be true to the church, to the Christ, to the truth. In church history when the age needed a reenforcement of spiritual power God has been mindful of the church's need. Protestant evangelical Christianity has reason to thank God for enlarged visions of the truth in recent centuries.

He spent a large part of his closing hours in showing how the Holy Spirit would help him in his work. Wherever Christ could go, the Holy Spirit could go. We therefore may pass judgment upon the results of Christianity and the results of the Spirit's efforts in the world. Jesus describes the work of the Spirit as "greater" than that wrought by Christ. The best times are those lying in front of the church. It was no backward movement ushered in by the Holy God, the Holy Spirit. There was a deep spiritual work in changing David's character (Ps. 51), a prophetical ministry created in Isaiah. There was a stupendous spiritual work effected in the first twenty-four's hours of the Spirit's opening work, when three thousand intelligent men laid aside their Jewish narrowness and became confessing Christians, pledging their faith to Jesus, baptized, joining his church. The Holy Spirit did not exhaust his work on that first day. Soon the three thousand became

five thousand, and a multitude of priests became disciples. In that first century, one hundred thousand followed Christ as Saviour. Men of kindred faith like Patrick and Ulfilas in gospel harmony took the torch and carried it over Europe.

III. *Pentecost is a fitting time to get a new conception of the work* of the Holy Spirit in throwing light upon the character of Christ. The Spirit has done a great work in revealing the character and moral beauty of Christ. It was the custom, years ago, in presenting a theology, to begin with the character of God and follow with presenting Christ. Today, we begin by showing the character and beauty of Christ and that Godlike qualities are revealed by Christ, thus making clear that the real qualities of God are found in Jesus. The Holy Spirit has shown how God can be best portrayed by revealing God in Christ. When Professor Gilkey of Chicago University appealed to thirty thousand Oriental students, his main argument was the character of Christ. Jesus taught that the preparatory work of the Christian life was dependent upon the prior work of the Holy Spirit. The Publican was acquainted with the Holy Spirit, the Pharisee had not met him. Paul thought himself the chief of sinners, and John Bunyan, who carried a burden on his back, was the very opposite of Walt Whitman, who envied the contented pig in the pigpen and so could have no sense of sin. Paul so preached that many believed and turned to the Lord. Blackstone said that when he visited the churches in London, he could not tell whether they preached Christ or Cicero.

Times of religious darkness result when the great themes of the spiritual life are not brought before the mind. Spiritually minded times are begotten by spiritually minded men. Moody said that preachers must be awakening preachers. When God becomes real to a man, then the contrast between sin and goodness becomes real. Christ opens the broadest view of the Holy Spirit's work, for he introduces him as the teacher of humanity, itself conceiving good and evil, right and wrong.

There is the moral progress of the age as it goes on and with varying degrees of rapidity and effectiveness; we ought not to think that the moral uplift of the world goes on without the Spirit being a part in a work whose character is a delight to God. Awakenings of public conscience, deepenings of conviction concerning right and wrong, higher and truer views of good and evil, reform and changes for the better, quickenings of religion, unquestioned moral progress—these are works of the Holy Spirit. To recognize these spiritual movements is to perceive that God is consciously working out in history holy and gracious designs promised by Christ. So in our country, slavery was destroyed, the national lottery business was banished, higher business methods were introduced, the questions of peace and arbitration were fostered by leaders and parties. Green's *History of England* shows how religion and the New Testament drove away corruption in government, the wrongs of women working in the mines and introduced a better kind of men and women. It was God at work in the better thoughts of men. We must give God credit for every holy and gracious work through business interests, or economic laws. God can work through the Holy Spirit, and we may thank God for influencing moral revolutions. It is the same spirit that works in a prayer-meeting and works through a sermon of Spurgeon.

IV. *Pentecost is a call for a new conception of God, as Spirit, present in the life of the world.* Jesus meant that the Holy Spirit should be a source of understanding and enlightenment. God made, by the Holy Spirit, a way, open in differing ages, for a fresh advance in the Christ's direct working upon men. Three hundred years ago, the Baptists were denounced for the Satanic statement that all heathen children were, as infants, necessarily lost. The Spirit worked an enlargement, made men conscious of a finer conception of God. The new church developed the mission interest in the world when Paul and Barnabas were touched by the heart of Christ. It was a new work discovered by Christ. When at Jerusalem it looked

as though the new church was about to break into pieces, Paul, Peter, Barnabas, and James met in conference. The Holy Spirit had a seat in the Council. The record of the Council declared, " It seemed good unto us and to the Holy Spirit."

The Holy Spirit was an active agent in the church. If the men who made the Apostles' Creed and men like the venerable Bede, Thomas à Kempis, John Wesley, Jonathan Edwards, William Carey, Adoniram Judson, Doctor Hodge, Doctor Weston, Doctor Hovey, and fifty of the leading spiritually minded people of the world would meet they could recognize by the Spirit's guidance the things essential to the world's best thinking in the line of salvation. Is the Holy Spirit able to work today works of the Pentecostal kind? It is often thought incredible that the Spirit of God is as great in the world today as in former times. Many think it is irreverent to believe that those times may never be equalled. But by such thoughts, we do injustice to God, impoverish our own life, and render our faith ineffective. The possibilities of the Holy Spirit are the present possibilities. Christ predicted for himself, through the Holy Spirit, a world-wide and general influence upon mankind, a convincing of the world; and this he not only regarded as impossible to him while he remained in bodily presence among men but as something more to be desired than anything that his continued bodily presence could accomplish. We are to be happy and blessed in having that Holy Spirit with us today, not dead, nor distant, nor different. It is the living, willing, acting Holy Spirit who can do more for us in the Church and in Christ Jesus, more than we can ask or think. Dr. John Owen, in his Puritan writings, bids us think of the Holy Spirit, call upon him in prayer, acknowledge his existence. In our meetings for worship, in our great gatherings there is a noted absence of prayer to and prayer for the Holy Spirit. The church must not forget what Christ declared was the great power given to the church—the power of the Holy Spirit. God the Holy Spirit, said to the church in Jerusalem, " I will show

you for the glory of God and the honor of Christ what I can do for you and through you!" It is ours to open the door for him to come in. May we not do in A. D. 1930, and onward year by year, what he did willingly and powerfully in A. D. 30? The Holy Spirit is not weakened by his inability but by the unwillingness of his people. We have in the Bible the entire Godhead at work for us and through us. In the Old Testament we have God the Father Almighty revealed in power, in love, in forgiveness; and in the New Testament the fuller revelation of God, the manifested God, founding Christianity and begetting eternal life.

THE ULTIMATE GROUND OF MORAL OBLIGATION

WILLIAM R. McNUTT

Is THERE an answer to a man's final "Why?" in the ethical realm? Is there a court, dealing with one's moral situations? If so, where is it, and what is its procedure? Is its jurisdiction affirmative or advisory? Such questions are recurrent in the thought of every generation. To raise them in ours has double pertinency, first, by virtue of the vocal emergence of that deep hunger in the hearts of the multitude for some word of finality, some infallible deliverance on matters of religion and morals, and second, because of the two mutually exclusive and contradictory answers given to that cry. On the one hand are those who cite this or that categorical pronouncement in church, or creed, or dogma, or book, saying, "Here is the immutable decree which you seek"; while others with equal insight and confidence reply: "There is no such oracular judgment given to us mortals, neither indeed can there be because of our very nature; each man must bear his own responsibility in these matters." Because of this divided counsel, therefore, one is made bold to take up once again the ancient quest for the ultimate ground of moral obligation, a quest for that court from which a man may take no appeal, for that deliverance which no one may flout with impunity.

Thus setting out the adventurer stimulates his initial courage with a goodly assumption, that somewhere there does reside a significant answer to man's final query, "Why is this the right course for me?" It becomes then an article of faith affirming that there is a significant, if not an immediately satisfying answer; for it is remembered that men are more readily satisfied by ease than by challenge, that they long for the summits but despise the climb, that they would oftener do right were not the price too high.

That the thinkers of the race have long pressed this same quest can not be denied. To retrace their trail, therefore, and evaluate their findings becomes the better part of both valor and wisdom. Hence the Intuitionalist; it was he and his school who taught that men are initially equipped with a sense of moral obligation, and that this potential capacity rapidly develops in the child, until very early he intuitively lays hold upon the norms of Right. This remarkable achievement is made possible to him by virtue of the fact that these norms, like the moral sense, are inborn or woven into the texture of the soul by the Creator's hand. Hence, one of few years would know immediately that it would be right, for instance, to protect his playmate against assault, or wrong to injure or destroy the property of another.

If these " findings " be true, we are immediately possessed of very firm grounds for moral conduct. Here is not only certainty but sanctity; the laws of God relative to right conduct are written on the soul in a hand legible even to the little child. Answer to man's ultimate " Why? " is directly given, like as Jehovah gave the tables of stone on Mt. Sinai. But when this teaching is scrutinized disturbing doubt begins to arise by virtue of the declared fixity of these inborn norms. It is not at all like life as we know it. General observation bends one toward the belief that where human life is there is never fixity, but rather freedom. Determinism as a philosophy never gets very far with most people, and these inborn norms of right constitute a species of that philosophy. In such there is seemingly no place for growth and progress; these demand fluidity.

With the rising science of anthropology came a mass of facts which confirmed these expressed doubts and confronted the inborn-norm theory with frank and open contradiction. Varying norms, even antithetical norms, of conduct were discovered among the peoples of the earth. There was far from uniformity of ethical standards, contrary to the satisfying theory of the Intuitionalist. For example, those were found

who held it to be a sacred obligation of children to kill and eat their aged parents that these might thereby find a tangible immortality in their offspring; but this belief and practise nullified the "inborn-norm" that it is always right to preserve life. And in addition to such discoveries it was everywhere discernible that ethical standards changed from generation to generation even within so homogeneous a group as a clan or a tribe, to say nothing of a race.

It came to pass, therefore, that the intuitionalist theory of the inborn-norm had to be abandoned. And at the same time, also largely for the same reasons, suspicion was cast upon the more primary hypothesis of a native sense of moral obligation. Men began to inquire if this feeling of "oughtness" were not also empirical, the product of racial experience. If norms of right and wrong were not inborn, why should the urge to reach toward these norms be thought inborn? So insistent became this questioning that renewed zeal arose for a review of the whole field relative to the seat of moral authority and the genesis of conscience.

Of course, from a very early date Greek thinking gave serious attention to this quest. Plato has pressed on, making Socrates sponsor for the doctrine that whatever was rationally apprehended as right, thereby became morally binding. The ethic was mental discernment wholly. This, however, did not satisfy Plato himself, who found a place for the norms of right conduct in his hierarchy of heavenly ideas. Aristotle, with his feet ever on the ground, took a very opposite position, espousing the theory of the social origin of ethical standards. He failed, however, to distinguish the two elements, norm and "oughtness." In fact this has been a nearly universal fault in ethical writers down to the present day; there are, to be sure, a few notable exceptions. To the Greeks nevertheless we owe a quite definite conviction that it is vain to seek an empirical or rational ground for the origin of "oughtness."

The school of the Rationalists, under the leadership of

such intellects as Hume, Locke, and Hobbes, dealt with the whole realm of morals after a fashion both thorough and critical. They not only threshed over all the old straw, they burned up all the chaff. They very harshly handled the innate ideas and inborn-norms of the Intuitionalists, and yet most significantly they retained the sense of "oughtness" as a part of man's initial equipment, a something given. It seems to them "an atom which cannot be broken up," thus confirming the Greeks and at the same time sparing a grain of gold from the mines of the Intuitionalists.

Interestingly enough, whatever "cannot be broken up" is quite certain to invite both attention and attempt. Adam Smith may be said to have led an attack in his endeavor to resolve the moral sense, the urge to do right, into human sympathy; or at least to trace its origin to sympathy. Bentham and Mill continued the attempt to break up this irreducible atom, and as a result gave us their famous analysis of "the sense of oughtness" into elements of utility, particularly those of social utility. They held that whatever one perceives to be socially useful he will immediately feel to be morally right. It is this doctrine which became the chief corner-stone of the Utilitarian school of ethics. The contribution of the group to moral thinking was not inconsiderable, particularly in the realm of social data and the critical study of the same. But despite great energy and undoubted mental acumen they failed to carry the conviction to students in general that the whole truth about the so-called ethical sense is expressed by the equation, "Oughtness equals utility." Even Mill himself was compelled to admit the "intuitive capacity for recognizing moral values as above other values."

Thus would have expired the Utilitarian hypothesis had it not been for the unforeseen but timely arrival of Darwin with his wide observation of social phenomena. His "struggle for existence" and "survival of the fittest" breathed the breath of a new hope into Utilitarianism, namely, the hope that it would

be discovered that man, in his long pilgrimage of progress had found the socially useful to be the morally right. This hope, though perennially unfulfilled, has continued to live. It has enlisted the energy and talents of such men as Westermarck and Hobhouse, not to mention a score of lesser lights. Their work is both voluminous and illuminating. They have succeeded in tracing the outworking of "the feeling of oughtness" into varied social situations as a vital social force. But they have failed utterly to discover the origin of this moral sense, or to show why it exerts its power as frequently to protect the socially unfit and detrimental as to safeguard the more fit and useful.

What seems to be the final bankruptcy of Utilitarianism is of late inspiring a revival of a modified Intuitionalism. Eucken and Bergson have furnished the materials for the erection of a new structure whose foundations shall be the moral sense as a category of the practical reason, innate and defying further analysis. One puts it thus, "These thinkers hold that the great significance of the 'sense of oughtness' is the compelling power of the purposeful life, and that the unity of our personality demands that moral judgment be not irrational, even though complete realization of unerring rationality be beyond our powers." Such thought frankly recognizes that the content of a given moral judgment is evolved through and by the social processes, but it refuses to admit this to be the case with that moral sense which initiates and gives significance to that moral judgment when it is hurled forth in the name of the personality.

Current psychology, or psychologies, press our quest for the moral ultimate to the vanishing point. There is a strong faith that if anything comparable to a sense of oughtness comes to have being in a man, it also has come by the process of social evolution, that whatever constitutes his initial equipment it is "without form and void." No one is more representative of this extreme position than McDougall who, in his *Social Psychology* writes, "Moral conduct consists in the regulation and

control of the immediate promptings of impulse in conformity with some prescribed code."

In *Human Nature and Its Remaking,* Professor Hocking presents an epitome of the positions of some of his contemporaries, relative to the moral urge, thus:

> It could be thought to develop in the form of altruistic sentiment from the maternal instinct (Sunderland): or from pugnacity as pugnacity becomes a "disinterested resentment" (Westermarck) turned first outward and then inward. For McDougall moral judgment is a complex attitude in which the "self-regarding sentiment" interacting with the social likes and dislikes has the chief rôle. Thorndike does not positively exclude it from our native endowment, but so far fails to identify its presence.

It is interesting to note, however, that even McDougall confesses to finding "promptings of impulse" which come under control and are directed toward a prescribed goal. This appears to be either the ghost of oughtness or its embryo. Which is it? This "prompting" functions just like the "innate moral sense" of the Intuitionalist except that it functions with distressing feebleness. One can but wonder if this feebleness is that of the new-born or of the senile; if the former there is the open door of possibility that a low voltage prompting may develop into a dynamic voice. The sense of dissatisfaction with the conclusions of these thinkers is by no means local; suppose we let Hocking speak for the dissenters:

> So much, however, is clear; that no account of human nature can pretend to have touched the important points unless it shows, in terms of its own theory, how it is that a man can *become* what we call a moral agent. . . And we have a double concern in this subject, since the human conscience is at once, in some sort of germ, deposited in man's original nature, and at the same time one of the chief elements in his remaking.

In another connection the same authority inquires:

> But would this socially molded conscience be identical with the conscience as we know it? The resemblance is, in reality, superficial. It is impossible that the "ought" as we mean it in its current use should be a social product.

Professor Mackenzie in *Souls in the Making* gives specific attention to the teaching that nullifies an innate moral sense:

> This ideal of character which plays such an important part in McDougall's explanation of moral experience is the end of "synthesis or harmonized system of moral sentiments." One is inclined to ask what synthesizes the moral sentiments, or what shall we call the synthesis? Or what canalizes the energy along the line of a moral judgment? This is the weakest part of McDougall's system. . .
>
> It seems to me that we get a much clearer explanation, and one that gives a real psychological basis for the authority and force of the moral "ought" with which we are all familiar, if we infer that the mind whose very function it is to coordinate its experience and regulate its behavior by the values it has accepted, works through conscience. After all, the self-regarding sentiment is acquired like other sentiments, and it is difficult to see where it gets the authority to legislate for the whole self.

These quotations serve to indicate that the "sense of oughtness" as a part of man's initial equipment is by no means driven from the field. We believe it is bound to come back as an inescapable fact, as investigation proceeds. If so, we may catch therein a strong intimation that this "atom which cannot be broken up" resides and operates in the vicinity of that ultimate ground, the object of our quest.

The foregoing survey makes convincing the discovery that the norms of moral conduct are evolved out of the trial and error processes of social living, plus, we are constrained to believe, that *illumination* which is a partial reward of the righteous. What is accepted as right by one generation is not so regarded by another, and even what a man holds to be morally valid in young manhood, not infrequently he wholly rejects with widening experience. The shifting of the standards of moral judgment no one could venture to deny. On the other hand to fail to see that the sense of "oughtness" abides, unchangeable, is to be blind to an elemental fact in every person's daily experience. And moreover it stands as an unshaken fact despite many storms of critical opinion. Back of all moral conduct lies the moral sense with its "ought-urge"

toward whatever standard of right is at that moment held by the actor to be valid for himself.

At this point there emerges another significant fact, namely, that any particular norm or standard of ethical conduct, however evolved, is not mine until I so decree. It may be highly approved by my group, and even by society in general, and yet I may completely reject that standard for myself. It may be clearly expedient from the standpoint of my own happiness or business success that I adopt the norm in question, and yet I refuse. Such is not a case of stubbornness but rather a conflict between an inner norm already adopted by me and an outer standard which presses for entrance. The latter comes well recommended, it has social prestige, it makes a show of authority, it even makes threats, and yet I remain unshaken in the conviction that the new-comer is less noble, less good, than the present occupant. Something within urges, Be true to the highest you know; do not yield to the pressure of this lower norm now demanding right of way. The fact to be here noted is that no external ethical standard is *ex cathedra, per se* valid for any man. Here is an element of tremendous import, bringing us a long league nearer the object of our quest, the ultimate ground of moral adventure.

As the Roman Catholic points to Church and Pontiff as the ultimates in the ethical conduct of the faithful, so Protestantism in general refers the seeker after righteousness to the Bible. This, it is claimed, is the Word of God and as such is final for all men. It is not our purpose here to argue the truth or falsity of these claims. It is desired only to call attention to the inescapable fact that in each case an external standard or system of standards is presented to the individual religionist as worthy of adoption by him as the rule and norm of his own life. Whether these norms exist by virtue of revelation or social evolution is wholly beside the mark; not one of them is valid for the individual until that individual accepts it and appropriates it for his very own. One would grant that the

voice of God " ought " to be ultimate for each and all, and yet he is confronted by the persistent fact that the individual must decide for himself whether or not the voice is that of God or of another. In other words every man stands guard at the door of his own life with the capacity, and hence with the duty, to determine who shall enter and who shall not. Whoever enters by stealth, or by clubbing the keeper of the door into submission, is a destroyer of the good man's house. Persuasion, sweet reasonableness, is ever in order, force never.

Thus are we brought one step nearer our goal; there is operative in man a law of freedom which makes for his moral integrity. He is lord over his own house. Even God, whom he " ought " to admit, he yet may exclude.

These considerations have already served to answer the Christian who urges his Lord as the only adequate ultimate for moral action. Suppose it be granted, for the sake of the argument that all men " ought " to accept his kind of life and his moral standards as their own. But note how aptly our language betrays the very truth for which we contend, namely, that even he is not ultimate for any man until that man accepts him as his own norm or goal. Jesus stands at the door and knocks, but he never forces an entrance. At the door he pleads a matchless gospel, but he will not enter until he wins a cordial invitation. That is to say, the Master who knows what is in man consistently recognizes the law of freedom operative in him and perceives some ultimate in the depths of the man to which he must himself make appeal.

" He spake as no man ever spake," said the people. Why did they thus respond to his words? Let us look at some examples of his own matchless teaching which answer the question:

"A certain man planted a vineyard, and let it forth to husbandmen, and went into a far country. And at the proper season he sent a servant to the husbandmen, that they should give him of the fruit of the vineyard; but the husbandmen beat him and sent him away empty. And again he

sent another servant; and they beat him also. . . . *What therefore shall the lord of the vineyard do unto them?*

And he spake a parable unto them saying, *"What man of you having a hundred sheep, if he lose one of them, doth not leave the ninety and nine in the wilderness and go after that which is lost until he find it?"*

"For which of you, intending to build a tower, sitteth not down first and counteth the cost, whether he have sufficient to finish it?"

"A certain man went down from Jerusalem to Jericho, and fell among thieves which stripped him of his raiment, and wounded him, and departed, leaving him half dead. And by chance there came down a certain . . . *Which now of these three, thinkest thou, was neighbor unto him that fell among thieves?"*

The point is that the Great Teacher appealed immediately to the judgment of the individual with his "What thinkest *thou?"* The "authority" at which they marveled was his *power to win the moral assent* of those to whom he spoke. His concrete teachings demonstrate the consistency with which he pleads his case before some ultimate within the learner. Never did he say, "Accept this because I, the Son of God, say so," but rather, "What thinkest thou of this matter?"

Therefore, on the authority of Jesus' own method our quest is narrowed at once to the periphery of the physical man. Somewhere within him is the court of final appeal, both for the teacher and the man himself. All the lines of our findings hitherto rapidly converge upon that *"in-a-man"* which constitutes him a moral being, one who "ought" to aspire to "the highest" he knows, to the noblest he may apprehend by the tentacles of his being. Whatever this something in man, the object of a narrowing quest, it functions not unlike a court of justice. There is seen the capacity, even the felt necessity, to evaluate all the norms of conduct brought to his attention, with a view to the selection of the highest and the rejection of others. Moreover there is present the ability, operating in accord with the law of perfect freedom, to order conduct in harmony with that of yesterday and today, or to reverse completely the direc-

tion of action. We have come upon some kingly, autonomous capacity in man; how does it function?

Opening the New Testament, attention is caught by a remarkable story, that of the conversion of Saul of Tarsus. Reading that story one's eye is upon the inner processes of Saul's life. By weighing all the evidence in his possession Saul, the young lawyer, had come to the conclusion that the new religion "ought" to be opposed and those who espoused it exterminated. Thus pondering there grew the conviction that *he* "ought" himself to prosecute this will of God. Consequently he set out, filled with what seemed to him a righteous zeal, toward Damascus. But as he proceeded he kept thinking, weighing and reweighing the evidence. And as he thus pondered he saw again, and in a new light, the gentle, noble, gracious Founder of "The Way." Thereupon his assurance of right forsook him, and he turned himself back from persecution even to the point of attaching himself to those whom he would gladly have slain. What happened? What procedure controlled that court within Saul which completely reversed a previous judgment?

This is clearly what happened within Saul, a normally functioning human being; there was a capacity within him whose business it was to assemble moral data, study moral data, interpret moral data, and on the basis thereof to create and announce the following moral judgment, "This course of conduct is right, in the light of the highest I know." In this case the previous judgment was, "It is right for Saul to persecute the followers of Jesus of Nazareth." Immediately there arose a second capacity saying in emphatic tone, "Saul ought, yea, must do the right." And forthwith Saul was on the way to Damascus "breathing out threatening and slaughter." But on the way, the first-named capacity kept to its task, conscious of the very serious mission upon which it had caused Saul to embark. And behold, when nearing Damascus, a new fact fell among those under consideration, namely the kind of princely, lordly man

He was who founded this new religion, and how very far He would be from persecuting any one who did not agree with himself—and that new fact caused a reversal of judgment, "It is right to forsake persecution and become a Christian." Then arose that other capacity saying, "Saul ought, yea, must do right." And Saul the persecutor became Paul the apostle.

In every normal human being these capacities are found at work. They are functions of the self in its fight to win that richness and integration which we call personality. It is to these that the quest for the ultimate ground of moral obligation leads us. Standing here there is no beyond; and those we have found are *Reason* in Saul which formulated and announced the moral judgments upon the basis of which he acted; and *Conscience* that came forward to enforce the judgment, in terms of action. Our quest leads to the conviction that these capacities, in embryo, are native to the human, are included in his initial equipment as man. They are a part of his rich inheritance from a Father's hand.

These findings nullify a popular theory that Conscience is an adequate moral guide. It must be observed that Conscience has only one function, and that a very highly specialized function. Conscience is charged with the enforcement of the judgments of right handed down by Reason. Conscience never tells one what the right is; its function is wholly executive. In the performance of its work Conscience has a total vocabulary of two words, "Do right," and these it shouts out as a vibrant command which causes the whole personality to tremble. It is the voice of authority, the voice of God within man saying, "Do right!"

Reason is charged with the antecedent and concurrent function of finding out what is right for the self on any given occasion, or in any arising situation. Coming upon a division in the way, from whence one path leads to the right and the other to the wrong, Reason must there and then point out the right. In short, Reason and Conscience always work in closest

cooperation, the one forges the right judgment, the other enforces it. A breakdown in this active partnership will always prove disintegrating and fatal to the personality; unerring moral judgments are of no value unless carried through into right conduct, while on the contrary a Conscience is helpless and worse than useless, if no valid moral judgments are delivered by Reason.

When is a moral judgment "valid" and how is it made? Let the last be first, How is it made? Reason is not unlike the naturalist who goes afield in search of specimens, which he studies, catalogs, and appraises. So does Reason on behalf of the self; it is in reality a fact-collecting, a fact-classifying, a fact-interpreting function of the self or personality. It classifies certain of its data as of moral worth for the growing and expanding self. Then suddenly there arises a situation involving elements of moral import. And such a situation always presents at least two ways, the right and the wrong. It may present many ways, for example, the right, the near right, the near wrong, and the wrong. In such a case Reason is called upon for a moral judgment which will set forth "the right" in bold relief. This involves a process of skill in the weighing of evidence, in the interpretation of data in the light of norms or standards of right which the self has set up within itself, standards which are of social origin *plus,* and which the self evaluates at present as its "highest."

We hold to the absolute validity of this Reason-Conscience partnership. It constitutes the integrity of the personality. It is the ultimate ground of moral obligation for each and every man. What his own best Reason decrees as right and his Conscience enforces, is for him right in that hour. He can never go behind or beyond this working partnership in his moral conduct. Not even a holy and omniscient God can go beyond his own Reason and Conscience!

This throwing of man back upon his own capacities in times of moral crisis may well cause some to fear. The respon-

sibility is disturbing; it seems so unsafe to one. And so it is; the Father of us all calls to venturesome living, that in a measure we may match his venture in us when he made us in his own image, namely as free, responsible, self-directing, moral beings. It is by this route of moral hazard that God proposes to make us his sons; he has no other way. The cry of " safety first " in the realm of growing life is the way of cowardice, not the way of the adventuring God. Should timidity possess one as he contemplates life to be an adventure wherein every man discerns within himself his own last court of appeal in moral and religious matters, he " ought " to remind himself of three facts: First, that though *he* be timid God is not, else He would have brought our moral processes under His own complete control. Second, that in the world of sense every man trusts his own powers fully and that despite the strict individualism implied, men yet come to a remarkable unanimity as to what is beautiful, what harmonious, what fragrant, what delicious—then why not also as to what is right? And third, that as religionists of the Christian order we are committed to belief in an Unseen Presence which helpfully impinges upon these moral processes. That is to say, this highly human court within us functions in the presence of One—there are present Reason, Conscience, and the " Shadowy Third."

The foregoing sketch of the movements of the human self at work in the realm of right and wrong, has among other virtues that of clarifying thought at this significant point. That such is a much needed labor is quickly apparent to any one acquainted, even casually, with ethical thought. There is almost utter confusion for lack of clear definition, if not of the *Ding an Sich,* then of its function. Conscience, for instance, is made a sort of handy man for all sorts of odd jobs; it may set up norms, it may reason, it may create judgments, it may feel approval or disapproval, it may be merely a prejudiced spectator, it may urge moral action, or it may, seemingly, do almost anything that a particular author needs to have done. As wit-

ness to a fatal lack of clarity of thought in this crucial sector of the self's functionings, let a few illustrations be made to stand before us. Even so eminent a thinker as William Newton Clark says:

> It is through Conscience that man becomes aware of the moral significance of life. Conscience is the judgment of a man applied to his own conduct, affirming that acts for which he deems himself responsible are approved or condemned by his standard of right.

In *Souls in the Making,* J. G. Mackenzie writes thus of conscience:

> Conscience is not a mere emotion; its judgments arise from the simple fact that intelligence canalizes itself along the line of moral experience as well as along other lines.
>
> But conscience is more than the capacity for moral judgments; those judgments are accompanied by feelings peculiar to conscience.

Dr. E. H. Johnson held Conscience to be

> "A feeling of duty or sense of obligation to take the course, whether of action or inaction, which the judgment has pronounced to be the right course."

Wrote Doctor Martensen, in *Christian Dogmatics,*

> Conscience is man's original *knowing together* with God (con-scientia) the relation of his personal being to God; an immediate, perceptible, co-knowledge with God.

Considering morality as determined by "End," Professor Muirhead defines Conscience thus:

> It may be said that Conscience is the whole or true self claiming to legislate for the parts. Its claim is the claim of the self, as a conscious and rational being, to judge any particular manifestation of itself in voluntary action . . . it rightly assumes the tone of command. . .

Once more, this time turning to a *Manual of Ethics* by Mackenzie, we find in a foot-note:

It will thus be seen that there is a certain ambiguity in the use of the term "Conscience." There is another ambiguity, to which we shall have occasion to refer by and by. Conscience is frequently, perhaps even generally, understood to denote, not the principles of moral judgment, but the feeling of pain which accompanies a violation of the moral law.

All of which serves to indicate a state of wide-spread confusion when writers come to deal with that complex of functions which constitutes the ultimate ground of moral obligation. Consequently, let it be again set forth plainly that Conscience is that *executive voice* which functions to carry through into ethical conduct the moral judgments made by Reason.

By no means all of our contemporaneous psychologies and psychologists will agree with us, however. There are those who avoid ambiguity of definition by denying the existence of Conscience. It is no less an authority than McDougall who pronounces it "a false psychological assumption," and finds its substitute in the outworking of the sentiment of self-regard. In a later work, the *Outline of Psychology,* he seems very considerably to have mollified his harsh antipathies when he refers to Conscience as "character developed under moral guidance."

Human Nature and Conduct shows Dewey yet unshaken in his earlier conviction that the so-called moral sense is a delusion. "The most general, if the vaguest issue, concerns the nature of the organ of moral knowledge." He adds his disbelief in the existence of an "unique faculty with its own separate jurisdiction."

He teaches that approval and disapproval of one's acts by his group begets within him a passion to do only those things which bring approval. He engages himself in such conduct not because he "ought" but because of the very real fact that this conduct brings the profound pleasure of group approval.

One of the best surveys and interpretations of present-day thought in the field of psychology is that by C. K. Ogden, *The Meaning of Psychology.* Here is a large volume which omits any consideration of the moral and ethical, which seems to many

the very center of significant personality. Of Jung he does say, he

> sees in many, indeed in most mental disorders what amounts to a moral failure to meet the exigencies of life, which should be set right mainly by re-education of the individual which aims at making him realize his duties and his work in the world.

No hint is given as to the proper method of moral re-education or how the self functions under those methods.

In *Why We Behave Like Human Beings* there is a silence, on all phases of the moral life, which shouts at the reader of its brilliant pages. Professor Dorsey is a thorough-going behaviorist who finds neither Conscience or anything even resembling it. The " unkindest cut of all " is to be left completely out of the picture.

For such writers the " powerful sentiment of self-regard " seems to perform the functions historically accorded to the sense of oughtness, those which we assign to Reason and Conscience. By this new explanation duty is reduced to that conduct designed to win group approval, in other words, duty becomes *prudence*. This is nothing other than an arrival at the ethical goal of historic Hedonism.

It would seem a sufficient indictment to say that by these teachers we are led to the tomb of an Ethic long since dead and buried. But that is not all; such an interpretation fails utterly to account for that conduct which not only ignores but even defies the socially approved, even to the point of ostracism, imprisonment, death. It fails completely to carry conviction to any one who is seriously endeavoring to grow a moral character, say under the ægis of Jesus of Nazareth. What society thought or approved affected His conduct in smallest degree, and so has it likewise little controlled his greatest disciples.

In further rebuttal let it be noted that no psychology, not even this unconvincing variety, ventures to posit the new-born child to be a total cipher. Some embryonic capacities must be assumed; and our whole contention is, as to origin, that the

moral sense sleeps in the same bed with all the other unawakened capacities. And when this is allowed the case for Reason and Conscience is clear. Buckham gives our cause strength when he writes in *Personality and Psychology:*

> Suffice it to say that the theory of conscience as an intuitive moral sense, developing as moral selfhood develops, is no more out of keeping with the evolutionary hypothesis than a theory which attempts to reduce the rich and intricate inner life of man to a mere interplay of animal instincts. Conscience is the knowledge that there is duty. It is awareness of the moral imperative.

The new psychologies have placed us in their debt by many contributions to the thought, and perchance the life of us all. But this is very far from endorsing all their teachings. Many things remain unshaken. Indeed the tide is even now turning against them among the thoughtful. For instance, Dean Rashdall presents an able criticism of McDougall's position under the title " Is Conscience an Emotion? " wherein he insists on the presence of the moral sense. Speaking to the same general point John G. MacKenzie, as cited previously, says, " This is the weakest part of McDougall's system." Even so significant a volume as *The Faith That Rebels,* by Principal D. S. Cairns, offers no quarter to those who would evaporate the sense of oughtness into the mists of the merely prudential. It reads:

> When we come to ask the further question as to whether the theory of Natural Selection taken alone can account for all the facts of the moral life, I think we must say that it fails conspicuously to do so. It has been present as a mighty and persistent factor in the development, but, when all is said, an external factor only. It has not created the moral consciousness of man. It has awakened, developed, and conserved it. On all this part of the debate the idealistic answer seems to me sufficient and conclusive. We cannot get out of Natural Selection and the evolutionary process above, either the full moral imperative or the intrinsic values which are revealed in conscience. The evolutionary account of morality can explain only the protective husk under which the moral reason of man,

which tells him the difference between the right and the wrong, grows up to maturity.

To quote Mackenzie again, author of *Souls in the Making,* as he writes regarding the rational element and conscience:

> They are the authoritative elements in behavior; their authority is derived from the fact that they legislate for the personality as a whole . . . We may refuse to give conscience and reason their authority in theory; but in experience they take that authority.

The Foundations of Character, by Shand, is generally conceded to be one of the significant volumes of the day. The weight of great authority attaches to the author's name, and it is he who writes:

> That there is a calm joy in fulfilling the dictates of conscience, and a peculiar sorrow in our failure to fulfill them, is familiar to every one. When we rebel against it and persist in our evil course, the sorrow becomes remorse.

Another witness, Ginsburg, in his *Psychology of Society,* bears further testimony that among psychologists there are many who do not sense the note of authority in the alleged findings which hold man's moral nature to be wholly a social product. To quote:

> No doubt the self-regarding sentiment is of great importance as a correlating principle, but the unity attained through it may be very narrow and unsympathetic. We could hardly admire the person who does good in order to be pleased with himself. Greater unity is attained by devotion or emotional attachment to large ends, and these ends must be of value in themselves, and not derive their value from the fact that they satisfy the instinct of self-assertion.

But suppose that time should establish as true the social origin of the so-called sense of oughtness? It would not at all modify the central position which we advocate. Origin may be considered a matter of more or less indifference; the important facts abide, namely that personality functions to forge moral judgments, and then moves with peculiar power to enforce those

judgments. The instruments by which, or channels through which, personality thus operates we name Reason and Conscience respectively. Their working partnership, as set forth earlier in this paper, is unaffected by the question of whence they came. They are here, and they work as indicated in the daily life of every man.

The practical bearing of these conclusions is at once apparent. They become potent in the whole educative process, and especially in those phases that have to do with moral conduct and character. The teacher in these fields will see in Reason and Conscience, and their proper team-play, the *sine qua non* of his pupils' growth in righteousness. His task will be conceived to be that of assisting the growing life to come into the full stature of moral and religious autonomy, to which end he will confront the learner with multiplied situations involving ethical elements and requiring moral judgments. In such situations the wise teacher will stand by as a friend and helper in the critical weighing of the data in hand, and in the forging therefrom of a positive moral judgment on the part of Reason, and a swift obedience to Conscience in terms of the appropriate conduct.

Moral and religious education thus viewed is a vital, life-building matter, and as such makes a peculiar demand upon the teacher, namely, that he be himself the incarnation of that which he teaches. He must himself be skilled as one who fashions sterling judgments of right, and he must be a respected witness to the virtues bestowed by a conscience honored in his own life. Thus out of his own wide experience will he be able to assist the youth to enrich his data-field preceding the handing down of a moral judgment. Here it is that such a teacher has both his grave responsibility and his very remarkable opportunity. He will instruct those under his care in the great wisdom of arriving at judgments on the basis of the widest possible data-area only, and in the folly, to say nothing of the humiliation, of making such from a paucity of data. He will present as line

upon line the fact that, however thin or immature the judgment made, Conscience proceeds at once to enforce it in terms of conduct which publishes to the world one's moral immaturity. Conscience has a way of seeming to display, as front-page headlines, the incompetencies of Reason in its faulty moral judgments.

Here it is that the Bible, in the hands of a capable teacher, plays its matchless rôle. It brings a rich cargo of ethical experience, of moral wisdom ground out by the millstones of the centuries, all now deposited as grist for the pupil, whose characteristic is moral inexperience. Thus conceived the Bible is a treasure-house which opens its wealth for the enrichment of the data-field of the morally and religiously undeveloped. All this the good teacher commends to his pupil as highly valuable for purposes of reproduction in cases of righteousness and as warning in cases of evil. He commends its treasures to the learner as unsurpassed for the enrichment of his own moral judgments and the invigoration of his own Conscience. When thus employed the Bible speaks with its full authority, the authority of its own worth, plus the influence of the teacher. With Book in hand the wise teacher stands before that ultimate ground of moral obligation within the personality of the learner, and there pleads the values-for-life resident in that which he brings. Reason may, of course, accept or reject his earnest presentation.

It would be well should each preacher rethink his function in the light of this Reason-Conscience combination which normally is operative in each of his hearers. At the very outset he will come upon the fact that his supreme challenge lies in the necessity that he enrich the data-field upon the basis of which the individual Reason acts; that then he must win from that Reason the moral judgment which seems to him desirable; and finally that he must strengthen each in his own moral purpose to honor Conscience in the straightforward act of righteousness. It would be wholesome for every minister to visualize clearly

this challenge since, sheltered by his pulpit, he is peculiarly tempted to hurl ready-made moral and religious judgments at his hearers, with the implication (implicit if not explicit) that these must be accepted on the basis of some "authority." He will do well to remind himself that no such authority may, in the name of God or his Christ, storm the doors of any man's personality. A recognition of the inherent necessity of *winning* an entrance will marvelously change the dogmatist into an advocate, transform one who demands into one who pleads. Then will the preacher see himself as an advocate before the jury, pleading for the judgment he desires. New vigor and enriched tone will come into his preaching as he thinks of himself as standing before the people, a special pleader of "the manifold grace of God" as it is revealed in Jesus Christ. He will say, "Woe is me if I fail to convince these that Christ ought to be permitted to enter the data-field of each as a controlling influence in all moral and religious judgments!" Such preaching has in it a romance never dreamed of by the cocksure, overwise dogmatist. The rôle of the "advocate" is exalted above all others by virtue of the fact that Jesus was uniformly and consistently the Advocate of God the Father.

And finally, those in the churches who aspire to be "workmen that need not to be ashamed" must conceive their entire program in the light of that Reason-Conscience court of final appeal, which in the end will pass judgment upon all that is undertaken or achieved. Should that program center in evangelism, narrowly defined, the method of procedure will be determined by the necessity of so attractively and appealingly presenting the Saviour of men to the Reason of each that he will be admitted to the data-field as an organizing and interpreting center, largely inspiring all moral judgments and all righteous conduct in the light of his own kind of religion. Or should that program be social centered, setting as its aim the creation of a Christian public opinion such as would be adequate to support the aspirations of the churches in such realms as industry, edu-

cation, government, and international relations, that program will be circumscribed by whatever method and procedure seems most apt to bring Christ into the data-field of industry, education, and the others named. That is to say, program and method must be determined by the necessity of his winning an entrance and the privilege of speaking in these large group councils. The churches then will resolve, in all their undertakings, to confront the Reason-Conscience partnership, whether in individual or group, by Jesus Christ and his right—purely on the basis of his inherent worth—to be heard. In other words those who represent him must at all times act upon both the pedagogy and the faith expressed when he said, "And I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw all men unto me."

THE LIVING BUDDHISM OF JAPAN

An Excursion in the Recent Literature

HORACE THOMAS HOUF

A RECENT wise observer in Japan records this incident: "The vice-abbot of a large Zen monastery which I visited near Tokyo, received me in his private quarters, at once his study and bedroom. . . . When, after an hour's interview, I started to go, the vice-abbot insisted upon our staying to lunch and would take no refusal. So after a little stretching of my poor legs about the room I curled them up again on my cushion, seeking to look as much like a Buddha on a lotus as I could—which for a Westerner is no easy thing to do. The lunch was served to us where we sat, and a dainty and tasty lunch it was. During our conversation over the rice and vegetables I heard the sound of a telephone and remarked that it seemed to me somewhat incongruous in a Buddhist monastery. Whereupon my host informed me that they had sixteen telephones in the monastery. He also added that the cooking for the monks was done by electricity." [1]

Prof. S. Fujioka writing twenty years ago about social changes in New Japan said: "Politics, economics, natural science, and art—everything was taken from the West with insatiable avidity, and the customs and usages of the people underwent a complete change, so complete that those alone who witnessed it can believe it." [2] He then cited instances: European clothes were adopted for ceremonial occasions by officials and then passed into common use. Sunday was made a day of universal rest. Many Japanese furnished one room in their native house European style and used it for a study or drawing-room. Foreign restaurants sprang up everywhere, and Japanese hotels introduced foreign dishes. The women

[1] J. B. Pratt, *The Pilgrimage of Buddhism*, p. 526.
[2] S. Okuma, *Fifty Years of New Japan*, p. 445.

adopted European styles in hairdressing. The flesh of pigs and cows came into use as food. Coal and petroleum were utilized for the first time. Colors were introduced into Japanese art. The Western piano and violin became fashionable. And so the account goes. More recently Professor Pratt says he found some of the younger monks equally interested in teaching their parish children the divine truths of Buddhism and the American arts of baseball and tennis. One abbot after an interview offered to send him to his next appointment by rickshaw and man-power, but upon observing the time was short, called for his auto and sent his guest away by gas. On the second anniversary of the great Japanese earthquake and fire disaster a Japanese Jodo bishop, seventy-one years old, made his visits for the day to his several stations in an aeroplane.[3] Thus concretely, only very much more so, has the West come to the East with penetration and permanence.

This has affected the manner of living of all Japanese. The convenience and comfort which accompany the adoption of many Western inventions and devices, are obvious and irresistible. Within a single generation they have become a fixed part of the order of things. It is not a question of refusing them but the urgent one of making such adjustments in living and in thought as their use requires. This has affected religious life and thought almost as much as in other fields.

The three religions in Japan have all been affected. Shinto which was essentially a patriotic religion of nature- and emperor-worship, is losing its hold. Christianity as a recent foreign importation has gained footing but is not indigenous, and has contributed most, indirectly, by rivalry and stimulation. Buddhism, although it came originally from India through China to Japan, has been appropriated and adapted, and is the religion of by far the majority of the people. The census of 1922 listed 48,725,000 as Buddhists, about two-thirds of the population. Many admixtures accompany it in

[3] Pratt, op. cit., p. 575.

popular usage, but Buddhism is the dominant factor throughout. Japan never has fully known or held the original simple Buddhism of Gotama, the Founder, the Hinayana now dominant in Burmah and Ceylon. The more philosophical Mahayana form was brought to them and they have reshaped even it. In 1927, J. Takakusu, one of their own leaders, wrote for the Western world an exposition of "the eight fundamental principles of Mahayana Buddhism." They are: Atheism, rationalism, idealism, elevation of personal character, non-injuring, infinite love, pacifism, and the equality of mankind. He explained that the Mahayana Buddhists do not believe in god or any creator of the universe. They do, however, hold there are "superhuman intelligent beings." Buddhism has generally insisted on "non-ego" and the radical renunciation of Self. Really, he explains, this is only the true method toward the elevation of personal character, for the true devotee moves from common manhood up to superhuman Bodhisattva and finally to absolute personality or Buddha-hood. "Salvation is through enlightenment; by self-enlightenment." "When man is not satisfied with what is generally considered self-awakening, that which other religions, science, or philosophy try to give, he will find in Mahayana Buddhism what he desires to win for himself, the highest of happiness, perfect freedom from fear, doubt, worry, and anxiety." [4] This is the dominant Japanese Buddhism of today as some of its foremost interpreters wish it understood.

"In Japan there are fifteen sects made up of fifty-six branches or schools" (S. Miyamoto, 1924). Of the older sects the Shingon claims far the largest number of adherents. In 1922, they had 12,290 temples, 16,483 priests, and 16,026,000 adherents. Adherence, here, means preference for purposes of the census, and should not be taken to mean too much. This sect is "highly mystical and intuitional" and holds a secret or esoteric teaching. It represents absolute truth as perceived by

[4] *The Young East*, May, 1927.

the Buddha. It is given "by intuition or in communion with the Absolute." It holds "the secret unity of all living beings with the universal Buddha, and the enlightenment of the universal Buddha himself which is secret from men." "According to it this energy of the Absolute is very active in the salvation of men." Armstrong considers the teaching of this sect a real pantheism with strong mystical and magical tendencies.[5] In the earlier days it appealed to the truly mystical temperament of many Japanese, and its superstitious and magical features made it available and popular with masses of the people.

The Zen sect now has about 8,346,000 adherents. It has been popular with the military and scholarly classes and exercises real influence today. It is based on "practising the presence of the Absolute." It relies on religious meditation. The practise of *Zazen* is its chief method. This consists in sitting, after proper preparation and cleansing, in certain prescribed postures and, by rule, thinking only on the unreality of self and all changing things, or not thinking at all. It aims to realize the unity of the believer with the Absolute, Buddha; and has done much to strengthen the stoical qualities in many Japanese followers.

Two other sects, however, are more truly Japanese and are today most influential. They are the Shin or the True Sect of the Pure Land, and the Nichiren. The Shin is the foremost of all Buddhist schools now active in Japan, both as regards numbers and activities. It has 11,700 temples, 2,236 preaching places, 40,000 priests, and 13,090,000 adherents.[6] This sect grew out of Jodo, the Pure Land Sect, which still is strong but conservative and less active. The Shin rely wholly upon faith in Amida, "the Buddha of immeasurable Light and eternal Life." This most merciful Buddha dwells in the Pure Land, the Western Paradise, and by his infinite merit and grace saves all who put their trust in him. The devotee attains salvation

[5] R. C. Armstrong, *Buddhism and Buddhists in Japan*, p. 65.
[6] Armstrong, op. cit., p. 96.

not by works or merit but wholly by faith. Even the endless repetition of his holy name is an acknowledgment of Amida's unmerited goodness and not a means to it. Writing in 1921, G. Sasaki, one of its leaders, said: "It is not a religion of goodness but a religion of truth. Whoever believes in the truth, he is saved, good or bad. Faith in religion expands and enriches one's life. One's deeds and conduct are loosened from the bond of constraint and become the movements of a free soul. . . Men of the same faith get united in one current of life." [7] The believer becomes wholly united in mind and heart with the saving Buddha. S. Yamabe, another adherent, says: "He saves from ignorance and suffering. We get united to the power and truth which is embodied in his name. All is suffering, all is unreal, impermanent, and there is no ego-entity." His salvation is "the transference of Amida's love on the believing hearts of all sentient beings." [8] Unlike most other sects the Shin permit their priests to marry, to eat meat, and to live as laymen while still performing their regular priestly duties. They also teach that Amida's love and grace embrace the women and children as well as the men. This sect has widespread popular appeal and is largely aroused at present. It has adopted many Western methods in religious and social work, and is carrying on considerable missionary enterprise. It is leading the revived and reformed Buddhist forces in Japan at present.

The Nichiren sect was started as a protest against perverse coolness in Japanese patriotism and loyalty, and against intolerable dulness in religion. Its founder denounced all previous sects and challenged the people to shake off their grave-clothes and undertake seriously to "establish righteousness and strengthen the state." Instead of adoring devotion to Amida, Nichiren called them to follow the Saddharma Pundarika, the sutra of the Law of the Lotus. This faith meant to unite all

[7] *The Eastern Buddhist*, Sept., 1921.
[8] *The Eastern Buddhist*, Jan., 1922.

believers with the original Buddha rather than any revealed Buddha. It was to be received by faith and manifested in the life.[9] Nichiren has only 8,180 priests and 2,811,000 followers but is considered a real power among several groups of the people today. S. Miyamoto of Tokyo, addressing an international Conference on Religion in London in 1924, said, " I close my address by pointing out that from the standpoint of ' living religion ' the awakening movements of the Shinran's doctrine and of the Nichiren's doctrine are especially to be remembered." [10]

All of these groups have been under hard pressure for the last fifty years (certainly since the Restoration in Japan in 1867) to adjust themselves to rapidly changing situations in political, industrial, and thought life. Western machinery and methods have poured in like a flood. Autos, aeroplanes, telephone and radio, railways, steel, oil, the cinema, inventions, factories, labor movements, everything material has come—and with a welcome. With intermingling by business men, travelers, students, and missionaries, Western scientific and philosophic thought has come. The industrial changes have revolutionized Japanese living and the new science and philosophy are challenging thought and religion wholesale. The pressure of international relations and politics has introduced civil and military reorganization, and brought in the ideals of democracy. Dr. M. Anesaki, himself a distinguished Buddhist teacher, says that the three factors which have made Europe and America and are now remaking Japan, are: Industry, Science, and Democracy.[11] This has industrialized Japan and her whole life is being run into new molds. Professor Pratt adds two historical developments as vigorous causes of the present change: The disestablishment of Buddhism at the time of Restoration, and the coming of recent Christian missions. The former cut off Buddhism's previous advantage over Shinto

[9] Armstrong, op. cit., p. 94.
[10] W. L. Hare, ed., *Religions of the Empire*, p. 197.
[11] M. Anesaki, *Religious and Social Problems of the Orient*, p. 35.

and the older Christianity and made it struggle out of its complacent lethargy into survival. The latter by its rivalry and suggestions of new and better methods spurred Buddhism into renewed life and activity.

The Buddhists have revived and are now more aggressive than for centuries. They are awakening to the times and are adopting the Christian ways of education and propaganda, and are restudying their Buddhist philosophy and tenets. They now have Buddhist elementary schools, middle schools, commercial schools, colleges, and universities. They use preaching extensively, public lectures, and summer schools. Societies of various sorts have been organized and journals projected. Translation and editing are undertaken. They have many Buddhist Sunday Schools, Young Men's Buddhist Associations, Young Women's Buddhist Associations, and even a Buddhist Salvation Army. Kindergartens, boys' clubs, dramatic societies, and the like, are numerous. There are Buddhist weekly and daily papers. They conduct labor exchanges and promote many social reforms. Especially have they established hospitals and dispensed medical aid to the poor. Serious effort is now being made to unite all Buddhism, both in spirit and actually, in world-wide endeavor. A Far Eastern Buddhist Conference was held in Tokyo in 1925 with representatives from several countries. Some of the popular audiences during their sessions numbered as many as thirteen hundred people.[12] The delegates "resolved" to cooperate for world-wide propaganda, to organize for religious education, to conduct Sunday schools and summer schools, to conduct girls' schools, colleges, and universities, to federate for Buddhist social work, to work for the welfare of women and children, to fight drink and opium, etc., etc. More than this, later and under other auspices, a convention was arranged for June, 1928, to which representatives of Buddhism, Shinto, and Christianity were invited for "the promotion of inter-religious

[12] Pratt, op. cit., p. 576.

cooperation" through discussion of "questions of common interest bearing on international peace, education, thought, and social welfare."[13] In 1927 Armstrong reported that the Buddhists then had 302 missionaries outside of Japan proper. They are at work mostly among Japanese outside the homeland. The last quarter century has seen rapidly growing activity among the Buddhists. Their humanitarian efforts are noteworthy. A government report for 1919 recorded a total of 701 organizations rendering service or relief to over 400,000 persons. These organizations included, among others, institutions for the relief of the Destitute, for relief of the Sick, for the Blind, Deaf, and Dumb, for Ex-convicts, and homes for the Aged, and for Children, Employment Offices, Lodging-houses for Laborers, Reformatory Schools, etc. Of these organizations, fifteen were supported by Shingon, forty-seven by Zen, one hundred and four by Shin, twenty-four by Nichiren, and the remainder by other Buddhists.[14]

Inevitably, and fortunately, proposals have been made by which it is hoped to adapt Buddhism to the new conditions in behavior and in thought. Mr. Har Dayal of India, in 1926, published to the Buddhist world a diagnosis and (as a basis for discussion) a prescription for the ills in Buddhism.[15] We know only part of the reaction the proposals got, but his proposals themselves are significant and indicative. He describes four factors in the present situation which are new but inevitable. Natural science with its imposing past achievements (and new ones every year) simply can not be ignored or gainsaid. In the face of it such things as "heavens, hells, Bodhisattvas," etc., must be given up. Popular education too is now possible and is a birthright of all people. The old pandering to ignorance and superstition by religious leaders must be quit, and the religion that wants to survive must help assume the obligation to supply this general education. Democracy and representa-

[13] Pratt, op. cit., p. 748.
[14] Pratt, op. cit., p. 593.
[15] *The Young East*, Sept., 1926, May, 1926.

tive politics is another emergent factor. The old oppression, false aristocracy, and tyranny must go. "The people can never love a religion that does not work for them. . . The religious preacher who is not a democrat in politics, is a humbug and a fraud." Then physical culture and beauty demand recognition. The body is our ally. Health and beauty are values in their own right. "The educated men and women of today cannot accept the old formulæ."

Nine definite suggestions are then given by Mr. Dayal for Buddhism in the future. It must lop off severely "the tremendous overgrowth of superstitions" such as supernatural Bodhisattvas, relic-worship, demonolatry, and its Western Paradise. It must maintain its position: "No god; no creation." Denial of "an immortal personal soul for each individual" must continue. Nirvana should be understood to be "deliverance from sin and sorrow in this life." All Buddhism should turn "from barren metaphysics to fruitful science." They should condemn all prayers, but encourage meditation and self-culture. They should seek "the synthesis and assimilation" of all the good in others such as Zoroaster, Christ, Mahomet, Confucius, and all the really true and great. Vegetarianism ought to be relaxed. Buddhist monks and nuns should be allowed, without being discounted therefor, to marry, but they should have "only one child." This is one program for conscious reform. It has had some discussion but has, so far as we know, wrought little else. Some of the things here urged are being gradually effected by the unconscious pressure of events. And few will believe that if these proposals were immediately and fully put in force, more than a beginning would have been made toward the final readjustment.

The great problem for Buddhism is not its rivalry with Christianity. Christianity has by no means supplanted Buddhism. Its presence has indeed been a stimulus to prick Buddhism into new life. Both religions are today a long journey from the primitive simplicity of the lives and teachings

of their founders. Both have adapted themselves repeatedly to changing surroundings and views. They are doing so now. Whether they should and will do so much more radically and rapidly remains to be seen. As M. Anesaki says, "Both religions are facing a common foe, both in idea and life, in the rise of materialism, which means the sway of commercialism, the spread of the exploiting spirit, the growth within the oriental nations of class hatred, as well as the aggrandizing commercial power of the Western nations—all of them tending to the neglect of Christian and Buddhist principles, and to the decline of religious life in general." Speaking of the Eastern religions he says: "One religion that remains in the field with some hope is Buddhism. But it is hopelessly divided, its organizations are parochial, and its tenets often too metaphysical." [16] Some who are informed view the future of organized Buddhism with much pessimism. Others equally well informed think its revival genuine and its future hopeful. It has accepted the challenge of Christian rivalry. The Western methods of propaganda, education, and social service it is appropriating wholesale. Its unmatched adaptiveness in many trying times is once more serving it well. Its main philosophy may prove advantageous rather than otherwise. Professor Whitehead says, "Buddhism is the most colossal example in history, of applied metaphysics." In 1926, J. Takakusu explained some of their doctrinal advantages by saying that the Shin Buddhists, at any rate, have no god, no last judgment, no prayer to Buddha or gods, no belief in Karma, no "eternal" heaven or hell. Among other things they still hold belief in transmigration. "Buddha denied the existence of substance for each individuality but not the individuality itself." Buddha's love, he says, was Mother-love which gives all with no concern for aught in return, whereas other religions offer only Husband-love which gives itself but expects as much in return.[17] It is impossible to pre-

[16] Anesaki, op. cit., pp. 31, 54.
[17] *The Young East*, July, 1926.

dict what the precise future of Buddhism in Japan will be. At present it is the religion of two-thirds of the Japanese people. It is an awakening thing, increasingly alive to the emergency and the task before it. There is sound prospect that it and Christianity, like two streams now together and now apart, will for many years to come flow through Japanese life to give it what they have of cleansing and renewal. That gift will be increasingly a simpler, saner teaching and a more varied and helpful service to all the people, here and now.

THE CULTURAL PATTERN OF OUR INHERITED CHRISTIANITY

STEWART G. COLE

1. *The Background of Historic Evangelicalism*

The early makers of America were, for the most part, a devoutly Christian people who had emigrated from Europe to escape the despotism of religion and to establish themselves and their faith in a new world. One of the first public exercises of these adventurers upon reaching the Atlantic seaboard was to thank God for their safe arrival and to plant a "meeting-place" in which they could honor his name. Every colony cherished its church. Whether in New England with its town-church order, in the middle colonies with their various sectarian groups, or in Virginia where Anglicanism prevailed, this institution with its sacred ministrations of worship and salvation served as the main support of its people's morale. It was an aggressive fellowship that spread the ideals of Protestantism throughout American life.

The Christianity these people sustained was strictly evangelical, a vital product of the Dissenters' reformation in seventeenth-century Europe. It is true that it took different structure in Pilgrim, Quaker, Baptist, and other groups, but withal it was underwritten with a compelling gospel of redeeming grace. The neighborly interests of the Western frontier were the formative influences leavening a new order of Protestantism. The warm pietistic fervor of Lutheranism, the strict disciplinary vigor of Calvinism, the passionate regard for ordinate living of the Puritan, practised in closely-knit agrarian communities blended to constitute an evangelizing faith of colonial Christianity. Later, Methodism was imported, contributing its revivalistic zeal. The absorbing interest of Christians was engaged in spreading the good news of salvation, while the

principle of voluntarism allowed them to express their saving faith in various sectarian organizations. The open Bible was the source of men's hope for eternity and the ground of social control for this life.

Revivals were seasonal phenomena in America. The Great Awakening shook every New England community to its foundations. The effect of the movement was felt throughout the populated country. Scores of churches were erected to give men an opportunity to express their social desires. When families migrated across the Ohio River, their Christian loyalties usually remained an integral part of their changing situation. When a whole community turned westward they took their minister with them and thus carried forward their organized faith without interruption. Preaching stations were constructed on the plains as rapidly as circumstances permitted. Itinerant ministers served the far-flung settlements of homesteaders. The Methodist circuit-riders occupied a signal place in the pioneer mid-West. Camp-meetings became regular district agencies of redemptive propaganda. Through the universal emphasis upon congregational religion people found God and his forgiving love.

Early in the nineteenth century denominational trunklines of organization spread across the country to gather up the loosely scattered congregations into more strictly sectarian movements. During this stage of Protestant accommodation, competing sects exhibited strenuous feelings. Polemic preaching was not infrequent. Doctrinal homilies and debates were common. Most self-respecting individuals belonged to one of the religious followings. Surrender to God and indoctrination into the Christian faith were paramount to cultural breeding as well as imperative to personal redemption. The weekly sermon and the parish school session reiterated appeals to young and old to obey the holy will of God. The Second Awakening in 1800 intensified the loyalty of Christians in East and South, and aroused in them a genuine missionary enthusiasm. They

adopted their own frontier in the West as a field for evangelistic endeavor. Within a few decades the gospel had been carried into the most remote sections of the great plains. Sectarian churches were built and manned. The American people had enlisted in moral support of the tenets of evangelical Christianity.

2. *The Religious Promotion of Higher Education*

The provision of an adequate Christian leadership became one of the most perplexing issues facing the church in America. In early colonial times the needs were met by migratory clergy from Great Britain and the Continent. As the population increased throughout the colonies, colleges were built to provide a trained ministry. William and Mary, Harvard, Yale, Brown, and the "Log College" were sponsored by Christian enterprisers, and mainly for ministerial purposes. As the settlements of the mid-West became rooted, the clergy followed their parishioners to the new territory. Lack of leadership became more apparent in both East and West. So acute was the demand for ministers that the frontiersmen themselves took means to recruit their churchmen by establishing denominational colleges. The development of these higher schools of learning was one of the most significant means of cultivating the cause of religion during the nineteenth century.[1]

The activities of church-founded colleges had significant bearing upon historic American culture. Though the institution's aim was educational, its emphasis was qualified by strong religious influences. Its president was usually a member of the senior clergy. Classical languages occupied a primary place in curriculum construction. These disciplines helped students acquaint themselves with the ancient Scriptural documents, a study considered necessary for the most thorough training in God's revelation to man. Much attention was given to moral

[1] During the first hundred years of its endeavor in America, Methodism founded nearly three hundred schools and colleges. In 1850 there were 6,000 academies in America under church control. In 1860, of the 247 colleges in America only 17 were State institutions.

science and deductive philosophy in classroom work. The "evidence of Christianity" was set forth in a course in apologetics and was, as a rule, a required subject for seniors. Men were encouraged to "give a reason for the faith that was within them" and to fortify themselves to meet the arguments of unbelievers.[2]

College administrators not only made a place for Christian traditions in their curriculum, but they were ardent evangelists. Bible study was a common, and often an obligatory course. Prayer-meetings were regular events, and periodic revivalistic efforts customary. It was one of the cherished ambitions of every college to see all its student body converted to Christ before the day of granting diplomas. Repeated appeals were made and special financial inducements offered to men to enter the sacred calling of the Christian ministry. The atmosphere of the small college was permeated with the evangelical *motif*. Every student, whether in preparation for the ministry or in training for secular pursuits, was faced with the redemptive work of God, the absolute necessity of conversion from sin, and the primacy of the local church in communal culture. The church and the college directorate were one in stressing a religious view of life.

3. *Toward a "Christian" Civilization*

The rise of the church to cultural control in America was no imperialistic policy of priest or king. Rather, it rose normally to take social supremacy.[3]

Religious traditions were of such a character that men associated congregationally to express their Christian fellowship. They participated in supernatural grace through a preaching medium. And the situation in which Americans sought to build a new world made the local church a welcome

[2] Washington Gladden has given an interesting account of this procedure in Williams College. *Recollections*, pp. 61-73.

[3] This position is abundantly illustrated in the *Annals* (vols. 1-10) of Wm. B. Sprague, and in the introductory essay, "The Influence of the Preacher," by Edward A. Park, in Henry C. Fish's *Pulpit Eloquence in the Nineteenth Century*, pp. 1-30.

rallying center through which people could reenforce their democratic ideals.

To the Roman Catholic mind God chose the holy church as it embodied itself in hierarchy and sacrament to convey redemption to men. The Evangelical conceived of the Holy Bible as the vehicle through which God revealed his salvation. The Scriptures authorized men to congregate in the church in order to experience inwardly the benefits of this gospel of grace. Theologically, the church occupied a vastly different function in Protestantism than in Catholicism. Psychologically, it served the human need similarly. Whether as a formal theocracy in New England or as an independent agent elsewhere, it acted as the structural and authoritative embodiment of the deepest spiritual needs of the people. Since it conveyed redemption to men, it became indispensable, central, sacred, among the people. Men respected its mission and claimed its rewards. It brought God and the sinner together in a supramundane fellowship. It gave the Christian absolute security and certain happiness while he lived out his span in a condemned creation and on a cold, bleak seaboard or open prairie.

Evangelicalism also tended to promote a church-centered civilization in the mundane sphere.[4] The local congregation with its weekly meetings tempered the will of the people in neighborhood matters. Most citizens grew up under the shadow of a near-by house of God. Every week this agency, representing the highest aspirations of man, gave direction to their civic consciousness.[5] By informal social contact men learned to look upon the church as the voice of conscience in all human activities. The Puritans maintained that only such men as were professing Christians were fit to officiate in public affairs. The remarks of Daniel Webster expressed the judgment of his contemporaries: "The religion of the New Testa-

[4] John Mecklin: *Survival Value of Christianity*, p. 20.

[5] As late as 1844 the progenitors of the Republican party, meeting in Buffalo to nominate a candidate for president, conceived of a platform in Christian terms.

ment—that religion which was founded on the teachings of Jesus Christ and his apostles—is as sure a guide to duty in politics and legislation as in any concern of life."

This conception of Christianity required a rather strenuous program for believers. Fear of the Almighty was a strong provocative force. Churchmen were to pray fervently for the salvation of the lost. Strict censure was in vogue to prohibit such worldly behavior as dancing, card-playing, and extravagant dress. America became in large measure an evangelically-disciplined social order. What Ernest Troeltsch called "a civilization of church authority in the fullest sense" did not misrepresent the occidental experiment. It reproduced the medieval culture to a considerable degree, though it brought it about by a more strictly democratic approval.

4. *The Basic Appeal of Biblical Indoctrination*

In such a culture the highest premium was placed upon a knowledge of the Scriptures. Since the Bible brought God's revealed will to man, it behooved every individual to familiarize himself with it. This position was fundamental in the structure of American Christianity. Men knew their Bible. They used it in public oration as in family devotions. Its wisdom on all subjects was irrefutable.

At church the Scriptures were expounded weekly in long and minute exegesis. The only strict requirement put upon the clergy was that they have a professional acquaintance with the Book. This gave them their "gospel." The homily overshadowed all else in the program of worship. The "General Instructions" given to the clergy by the American Home Missionary Society (May, 1830) specified that "the preaching of the gospel holds the first and highest place in the vows and responsibilities of the ministerial office."

Closely akin to acquaintance with the Scriptures, Evangelicals associated right doctrine. It was essential that good Christians know *the* truth for that truth would preserve their

faith.[6] "Thus saith the Lord" was the greatest purchase a man could employ over his own soul or that of others. All Christians were free to have such an assurance through the teaching and preaching ministry of the local church. The catechetical class introduced the novitiate to revealed truth. Preaching and evangelism popularized the doctrines. Testimony and class-meetings afforded men a chance to express them lucidly. The story of the fall of man, his hopelessness in sin, God's free grace in Christ, the universal need of salvation, the rules of the righteous life, means of sanctification, the second coming, final judgment, rewards and punishments, all became common subjects of knowledge and necessary to a valid Christianity.

Such strict regard for a Biblically-indoctrinated people was not solely the aim of the church. The public school and the sectarian college inspired their programs with a similar ideal. In the public school system Biblical materials constituted a major subject of study for the first hundred and fifty years of American history. In the monograph, *Colleges Essential to the Church of God; Plain Letters Addressed to a Parishioner,* John Todd interpreted the spirit of the times.[7] To the question, "Why must our churches be called upon to endow and raise up colleges in which to educate physicians and lawyers?" he answered:

> There can be no doubt but we must have lawyers and physicians; and they must be educated by somebody. Which is wisdom—to have them brought under the power of an education strictly Christian, which will exert a silent influence upon them for life—imbued with the philosophy of the church—trained by her intellectual principles, breathing in her atmosphere, or to have them cast off to be educated under the influence of infidelity, or even by teachers who live for this world alone? What an inconceivable difference it would make in this nation if all who studied law or medicine

[6] The "knowledge" theory of participation in Christianity prevailed universally until recent times. John Miley presented the major premise of the position when he insisted that "clearly a knowledge of the central truths of Christianity conditions Christian consciousness and must be first in order." *Systematic Theology,* vol. I, p. 21.

[7] Document reported in P. G. Mode's *Frontier Spirit in American Christianity,* pp. 73, 74.

or became teachers had been educated in schools not controlled by the piety of the Church of God? . . This is precisely the principle on which she acts when she rears a college to educate her ministers and yet makes provision so amply that all the mind which is educated in the land may be trained under the most decided Christian influence.

The test of Christianity was twofold—right belief and proper conduct. Norms of behavior grew out of Puritan experience, and principles of doctrine sprang from strict devotion to the Bible and its associated evangelistic scheme. As a matter of fact, owing to the church's chief emphasis upon the exposition of God's Word in sermon and testimony, the test tended to become a way of discourse rather than a standard of living. Proper knowledge was prerequisite to personal salvation. A Bible-controlled Christian faith and a church-ordered social cult constituted the joint authority in historic American civilization.

5. *Ideals of Church and Society*

This traditional culture is so marked in contrast with that which most men are familiar with today that it will bear more careful analysis. To affirm that Christians were church-dominated in their whole range of human interests may not indicate clearly the prevailing type of social ideals. What was the psychological structure of society and how did personal character develop? In preindustrial America the predominant this-worldly concern of men was agricultural.[8] Whether people lived in country or town (there were no cities in the modern meaning of the term), their behavior was ordered in terms of simple, face-to-face production and exchange of the goods of the soil. The neighborhood was a vital force in society and functioned as a concrete interplay of personalities. Friendship or enmity relations between individuals were powerful factors in such an intimate organization of the community. The fel-

[8] Note the Statistics, Charles H. Sears: *City Church Planning*, Chap. I.

lowship of the typical community was like unto that of the old-fashioned family.[9]

In such a society the church served. Life was strenuous in the new country where men were wresting a secure settlement from the stubborn forces of nature. Difficulties and dangers constantly burdened the mind of the pioneer. Added to this was the pressing desire for safety of soul in God's economy of grace. Men knew they were sinners, and most of them were greatly concerned to have their sins forgiven. In the midst of an intensely personal society and in the face of anxiety within the individual's heart, the church spoke the confidential word. Pardon of guilt, peace of mind, assurance of participation in a perfect world to come, fell like manna from heaven upon the troubled toilers for food and seekers for salvation. It was not strange that the church of the evangel towered over other institutions in community influence. It was little wonder that people looked up to the church as a savior superior, as Almighty God's agent at work among them. The personal significance of this religious force and the social status it received can scarcely be overestimated.[10]

Within such a culture ideals tended to be rigid and absolute. The intimate basis on which society was organized required their fixedness. Folkways and traditions determined norms of action. There were no two "rights." Virtues and vices took on the form of finalities. Local sentiment and criticism provided the means of conduct control. The status of a person was set by his neighbors who knew him well. Taboos were definite and strictly enforced. Idiosyncrasies of the personality were not weighed on merit; social treatment was extended without objective diagnosis. Temperamental motives fixed the community's punishments and rewards of the indi-

[9] The traits of this rural-pattern social order are treated in such texts as those of C. H. Cooley, *Social Organizations;* Park and Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology.* The student characterizes historic agrarian society as "primary group" in contradistinction to widespread "secondary group" organization today.

[10] Splendid descriptions of this type of community life are to be found in such books as Washington Gladden's *Recollections,* Chaps. 2, 3; William Lawrence's, *Fifty Years,* Part I.

vidual. Life was governed by an emotional and compulsive system of ethical principles.

To observe the church in this type of situation is to recognize a regulative agent of the first importance. It played the rôle of a medieval martinet or that of a humanitarian savior, as occasion demanded. Its ideals were as absolute as those of the milieu it shared. Either an individual accepted the salvation the church offered and became a Christian, or he wilfully neglected divine forgiveness and was informed of the sufferings he would experience in the next world. Either a man sought the fellowship of the saints achieving happy social status, or he lived independent of the church enduring the rôle of the religiously disclaimed. When conversion occurred, the highly emotional experience insured the reality of the "new birth." The suppliant prayer for pardon and peace gave the participant all that auto-suggestion could offer, and it served as a reeducational force in reforming his character. A definite and final salvation was guaranteed to any person who fulfilled the evangelical law. That immeasurable blessing claimed, the sinner immediately entered a new world of recognition. Thereupon he took as his religious guide and regulator the voice of the church, which spoke its evangel in the disciplinarian terms of current culture. When, therefore, the historian describes traditional American civilization as evangelically-dominated, he has in mind the type of individual and corporate life that has been treated above.[11]

But when, in the latter part of the nineteenth century, science and industry introduced a new stage of national development, religion slowly suffered dislocation in community life. These mundane forces prompted the great city and a welter of novel human interests that were foreign to Christian consideration. The church was pressed more and more from the center toward the circumference of social regard. Secularism engen-

[11] Ernest Troeltsch's interpretation of Protestantism in *Christianity in Progress* represents in principle this situation in the Western world. Note especially pp. 67-69.

dered an idealism which disagreed with that of the old-fashioned religio-social culture. Some churchmen accepted the disagreement as an opportunity to restate the Christian faith in terms of human necessity and of the new learning. Others considered the occasion one to merit a more strict exhibition of evangelical orthodoxy. Multiple gospels arose within the church precipitating serious discord. Spokesmen to the issue often doubted each other's sincerity. The militant spirit of the World War reenforced doubts and dogmas. The recent harvest of theological and ecclesiastical controversy should be interpreted in the light of this sequence of events. If Christianity is to benefit from the debacle from which it is emerging, does it not behoove its leaders to rethink religion, not only in terms of the postulates of modern science and industrial society, but also (and in this respect " liberals " have been neglectful) in the light of the historical and psychological processes that are indigenous to its own growth in America?

FAITH AND NEW KNOWLEDGE

HENRY FELTON HUSE

Such is the intellectual progress of mankind that, as some one has remarked, every ten years adds to the already accumulated store of knowledge an amount equal to that of the preceding century. With such wealth and tidal waves of new knowledge pouring into the mind of man it is not surprising that individuals should arise to challenge the verities and values of the Christian religion, thinking that science discredits faith, and that the new knowledge throws the old gospel into the discard. A man not long since passed the comment to me, "So and so back from college says that big men no longer believe what you preachers are saying." It is true some big men do not but the biggest men do.

Faith and Psychology

Of all sciences that have made progress in recent years none has apparently made greater than that of psychology with its new understandings and interpretations of the human mind. Indeed we are told that psychology has added to its store of knowledge during the past thirty years more than in as many preceding centuries. The names of James, Hall, MacDougal, Freud, Jung, Watson, Hadfield indicate the thinking that has been done and the influence the ideas of these men have exerted.

There is a psychology skeptically interpreted that destroys the Christian Religion as it undermines and denies the objectivity of the great factors of our Christian faith, God, the unseen realm, immortality. It is the thinking that makes these noble beliefs as Mr. Walter Lippman has expressed it, "a grandiose fiction projected by human needs and desires." Now there is no one who seems to set forth so clearly the process of reasoning whereby the grand objectives of our faith are

reduced to the fictions and phantasies of the mind as Prof. John Dewey in his reconstruction of philosophy. That which distinguishes man from the beast is memory. Man as he recalls the past reconstructs it. He recalls and reconstructs his past experiences not as they actually were but as he wishes they might have been. By this process of reasoning past experiences are reconstructed in a manner favorable to oneself. Disagreeable things become agreeable, or not so bad as they really were. Man thus mentally creates what he would like to see. In this way man has evolved the ideas of religion. The subject-matter of religion therefore is those empty conceptions of reality that enable man [however much he deceives himself] to meet the hard experiences of life that otherwise he would not have the courage to face. Man has thus built up a mental mechanistic defense to enable him to meet disappointment, sorrow, tragedy, death. One is reminded of the brilliant Keats dying in a panic in Rome and sending his friend Severn to search Rome for a Bible, for "a man ought to have some kind of a religion to enable him to die decently." The echo of Emil Metchnikoff is heard even today from many lips. Christianity—revealed religion—is an imposition. Existence is a kind of bad joke, a *faux pas* in the evolution of sentient organisms. Rather than accept the "conclusions" of science humanity has preferred to deluge itself with the beautiful mirages offered by religion.

If all this is true then indeed religion has no objective realities. It's all a subjective experience. The Christian religion like all others is man-made. God is but the shadow of a man upon the clouds. Religion becomes humanistic, a looking-glass religion in which, at its best, an ideal humanity becomes an object of worship and the one incentive to conduct. God ceases to be, and with him any divine imperative. Ethics and moral standards become what the social group sets up, subject to change as man's wishes and interests change, or as one group supplants another. Every man does what is right in his own eyes. In all this we see the breakdown of Christian morals, and

the setting up of moral anarchy. We see moreover an explanation of the moral confusions of the times.

In battle it is an achievement when one can spike the guns of the enemy. It is a greater achievement, however, when one captures the guns of the enemy and turns them upon the enemy to his discomfiture and defeat. Now if there is a psychology that would destroy faith there is a faith that may capture psychology.

What if man has by his thinking evolved these ideas of God, the unseen realm, immortality to meet the needs of his soul and to overcome the distresses of this earthly life? If man has so thought it is because God, who fashioneth all things, hath made it possible for him so to think. Surely there can be no nobler or more enlarging ideals and ideas of life than these given us by this thinking. It's Platonic to be sure, but sound philosophy. "Reality lies in the direction of our noblest thinking," and in thus thinking faith sees that as man has thus reached out after God, God has been reaching out after man. The psychology that may seem to destroy the Christian religion, faith appropriates and so establishes more firmly the gospel of God, who moves the soul of man to seek God, even as God himself is ever seeking man.

Faith and Philosophy

Ultimates are unattainable. The best that man can do in his thinking is to strike the main highway and travel in their direction and to go as far as he can. Both philosophy and science demonstrate this. For after climbing the peak we think is the highest, and reaching it, we discover a higher farther on. Columbus crossed one ocean and reached the continent. But others crossed the continent to find another ocean. Our universe was once a little affair, sun, planets, and what stars we could see with the naked eye. But now our sun is but one in the myriads swarming the Milky Way. Now our universe is but one of many. Ultimates are unattainable. Philosophy is the

effort, however, to reach out as far as possible in the direction of ultimates, the basic realties, of existence, human and divine.

Now what determines a man's philosophy is his faith or lack of faith. Religion posits God. If a man have faith in God he builds his philosophy upon this faith as he builds everything else. If a man does not have faith he excludes God from his thinking altogether, or tries to. If a man has faith in God he finds God everywhere. If he does not have faith in God he finds God nowhere. A subjective God, however, a God that is simply an idea, without objective reality, is not the God of the Christian religion, the God in whom as Christians we believe. The subject-matter with which philosophy deals is that of experience and nature. Faith finds in experience and nature that which bears witness to God, and a universe beyond things temporal and visible. Unbelief does not. What faith does in fashioning a philosophy, and what unbelief does is nowhere more clearly set forth than in Professor Edgar S. Brightman's account of *Philosophical Ideals.* "One may hold the view," he says, "that experience and nature are brute facts, having nothing ideal in them, yet capable of being more or less subdued by man and so used for ideal purposes. On the other hand one may hold that experience and nature are in some sense actually ideal systems, deriving their meaning and even their existence from their embodiment of ideals. One view holds that ideals are more than human utilities, inventions for maintaining human existence in a cosmos indifferent to ideals. The other finds in them a revelation of the very structure of the real world beyond man." In other words one man finds God in his thinking and explains what he finds in terms of God, Creator and Lord of all. The other man excludes God altogether. Man is himself alone. Both man and the universe are without God.

In the *Story of Philosophy* by Walter Durant, the table of philosophic affiliations is such that it classifies men and their philosophies according to thinking born of faith and expressing

faith, or thinking that excludes God and that witnesses simply to unbelief. Now as in the past we have the two opposite schools of thought. We have today, as yesterday, philosophy which brings support to the Christian religion and philosophy which discredits it; as the latest type of humanist discredits it, offering a God that is man-made, and a "religion" that is a man-made religion.

Religion differs from philosophy in this, as Doctor Valentine points out, "Religion posits, as an essential attribute to reality, responsiveness. On this simple issue of the responsiveness of reality religion stands or falls."

Can then the Christian religion be proved? If what works is true, as pragmatic philosophy asserts, then Christianity is proved true; for when premises are fulfilled there follow the logical conclusions; when conditions are met salvation is experienced, life is enriched and perfected. "Act as if I were," said the voice of God to Lady Henry Somerset in the misery of her doubts, "and thou shalt know that I am." Luthardt once said, "God to be found must be sought, to be sought he must be known, and to be known he must be loved." And the author of Hebrews long ago laid down the philosophic position of the man who would enter into the God-experience: "He that cometh to God must believe that he is, and that he is the rewarder of those that diligently seek him."

The God that the believer posits and finds is "not the universe that stands over against mind. It is not merely the absolute that includes and absorbs mind. It is not the synonym for reality. It is reality conceived as a system, and that as a system has a nature. God is the characteristic of the system of reality. Religion posits this God responsive to the needs of evolving, integrating, completing personality." (*Valentine.*)

Faith and Science

The business of science, as distinguished from philosophy and religion, is to explore and find out what it may of the exter-

nal material universe from electrons to stars. No man ought to lose his faith in the study of science. Rather he should have his faith confirmed in a nobler, enlarged, and richer conception of God, maker of heaven and earth. The peril in the study of science is an "overbalanced intellectuality," that swamps and stifles the religious attitude. If we never pay any attention to music or art, we shall never develop an ear for music or an eye for art. Some men lose their faith even in youth, so that all their later studies simply plunge them deeper in unbelief and confirm it. Such a man seems to have been Bertram Russell. Of him Ralph Bliss Perry states:

> His general outlook on life is one of disillusionment rather than faith. The acceptance of the teachings of science undermines the common religious beliefs, and throws the emancipated mind upon its own resources. Renunciation of vulgar hopes paved the way to a worshipful contemplation of beauty, a proud acceptance of fate, and a courageous loyalty to one's vision of the best.

One thing science has done for us in recent years is to establish as never before the reality of the invisible realm. With its electrons and protons, its waves of electrical energies, its spheres of influence, it takes us out of the realm of things visible into the realm of things invisible. As it has explored the elements it seems to have closed the door to that which is matter and opened it to that which is not matter. In the electron it seems to have reached that point of contact between the Creative mind and the thing created, we seem to see the touch of the Hand that fashioneth all things with purpose, from atom to far-distant swarming stars blazing their way through depths of unfathomable spaces.

Moreover creative process are shown to be in the laboratory as they were in the beginning when the morning stars sang together—both instantaneous and continuous. God said of old, "Let there be light! and there was light." Science would indeed seem to confirm ancient faith as it explains the processes whereby the things that are have come to be. Science today

is indeed rewriting the nature of the physical world, but in all that is coming to light faith is not destroyed but strengthened.

But that a man has no need to lose his faith in the study of science is evidenced by the great men of science who not only maintain faith but have it increased and strengthened. How refreshing their testimonies in these days of so much doubt and confusion. "Not a single discovery," says Michael I. Pupin, "that science has made tends in the least to contradict this innate feeling that a definite Intelligence is back of everything. Science instead of taking God out of the universe brings us into a closer relationship with him."

When we take all the facts of the universe and man into consideration, weigh them and compare them, rightly estimate them and draw conclusions from them, while as Arthur Stanley Eddington has said, "we may not prove" the existence of God, yet we get an assurance of God that is sufficient and that becomes such overwhelming probability as to be the equivalent of proof. "Our assurance of God is consciousness of a relation rather than a flawless proof of his existence." In the Terry Foundation lectures at Yale Robert Andrews Millikan appears surely as a defender of the faith. "Modern science of the real sort, is slowly learning to walk humbly with its God, and in learning that lesson is contributing something to religion. . ."

The key-word to religious experience and certainty is a word the Bible gives us—the word "faith." One might be sent to the finest school in the country, one might have put into his hand the finest text-book ever written, one might have for a teacher the most masterful mind in the subject to be found, but without attention that individual would not and could not learn anything about it. What "attention" is to general knowledge "faith" is to religious knowledge and experience. These two words "Faith" and "Response" are the two key-words to the better understanding of God. As Doctor Valentine has said, "All knowledge is ours through response of one kind or

another." God is a responding God. As we call unto him he answers. As we ask we receive. As we seek we find. As we knock it is opened unto us. Thus we—as the men of old who were sure of God, even though they did not know the universe as we today know it—thus we too with all our increased knowledge may say with equal assurance and certainty: "We know that the Son of God is come and hath given us an understanding, that we might know him who is true, and we are in him who is true, even Jesus Christ his only begotten Son. This is the true God, and this is eternal life."

CONDUCT

FRANK GRANT LEWIS

I RECALL a distinguished citizen. At the time of which I am thinking he was eminent in business, in the field of statecraft, and in church affairs. These combined characteristics at once make the man an unusual and suggestive example in the field of conduct. To be sure, such a combination of qualities would not in itself render this individual so interesting. The unusual interest arises from an incident in the career of the man which does attract attention as soon as it is considered. It chanced that I learned personally of such an incident.

Among those employed in the large business of which this man was the head were various young women stenographers. As was natural, some of them desired to better their financial situation by securing larger wages. One of them applied to an employment agency. She was asked where she was employed. Upon giving the name of the business with which she was already connected, she was told that her name could not be enrolled because, if it were accepted, the employment agency would have no further opportunity for doing business with the firm for which she was employed.

In a way such an incident is trivial, a slight item in the conduct of a large business in an extensive business world. At the same time it illustrates a type of conduct which is of very distinct interest, and so recognized by those who consider the moral qualities of every-day life—a type of conduct which is ordinarily condemned in principle, even on the part of those who in practise may find similar action either apparently required, in view of life as it is, or preferable in view of what business conditions urge.

Interest in such an incident arises further from the fact that it is, to a considerable extent, typical of what is occurring in social life as a whole, even though the particular form given

might not often appear. In fact such conduct offers itself in a wide variety of forms and concrete cases, though the principle underlying all is essentially the same, namely, the choice of a business, or a political, or personal step which is open to reproof from the point of view of morals, though freely practised in life.

It is the widely prevalent occurrence of such conduct which inevitably brings us face to face with its meaning; not so much, however, its meaning in itself (since this conduct carries its own disapproval for all right-thinking people), but rather because it compels us to face the fact of the persistence of such conduct while at the same time ethical standards, accepted in principle by the best minds, place such conduct under ban.

The incident cited at the beginning of this article finds its significance partly in the fact that the eminent business man was at the same time eminent in religion. Religion is assumed to prevent such conduct, even though it may be tolerated in the ordinary business world.

It must be taken into account, however, that, if this man had not been a leader in church affairs, such action as he assumed in business would still be subject to criticism and would be condemned on the part of those with good moral standards, whether the act were identified with church life or not.

The problem before us is really a problem of moral lawlessness. Society assumes ethical standards. At the same time there are many who should naturally live up to those standards, who, nevertheless, violate them when the pressure of business, or political, or personal exigencies urge such violation, as the practical method. The problem is now acute in the realm of the liquor business, where the laws governing the situation are well understood, where a considerable number of those who are regarded as good citizens either ignore or slight those laws, and yet they are not condemned for the course which they pursue. The current situation is particularly illustrated in the new

problem of traffic regulations, where the rules are many and specific, yet are largely ignored in practise.

One is aware, of course, that the matter of liquor law violations, that of traffic rules, and the instance of the typist are items very dissimilar in form. That very dissimilarity, however, serves to illustrate the situation with which we must deal if we are to understand the moral problem, the question of conduct, which underlies the situation as a whole.

As soon as we thus seek to understand the problem one of the items which become clear is that mere rules, laws in themselves, do not solve problems of conduct. Business rules in themselves would not permit an employer to prevent one of his employees from securing a better position. Even business rules, however, are set aside or forgotten, for the time being, in order to handle a situation for financial gain. In the case of the liquor problem the laws and regulations are likewise ignored in order to satisfy personal wishes or to please a sort of spirit of daring. Traffic regulations do not control, either because they attempt to govern details which are beyond control, or, because, on the part of the operators, rules in themselves mean nothing.

Such considerations as the above are too familiar to need amplification or further proof. They do, however, at once bring us back to further study of the underlying difficulty.

The difficulty is this. How has it come about that the moral sense so largely and so frequently condemns that which is common in the practise of no small number of people? Why is it that we must so frequently put a question-mark after a case of conduct? How does it come that such every-day affairs as those which have been sketched are continually presenting practises for which as yet we have no satisfactory explanation?

Any response at all likely to mean advance in our thinking, and eventually progress in the field of conduct, manifestly cannot hope to solve our problem by further emphasis upon either ethical principles alone, or laws as such, or on detailed

regulations, as sufficient to remove the infelicities in conduct which are widely deplored. It may be that these difficulties are due, to a considerable extent, to the emphasis on law as a remedy for conduct, when the need is something more basic than law can be. Perhaps the emphasis upon rules as primary guides for good conduct has tended to obscure, and eventually has blinded men to, the real ethical issue inherent in the complex social life now everywhere so obvious.

As soon as we look seriously for a solvent for the problem there is recourse frequently to religion, and a complaint that religious leaders have failed to give the assistance which has been needed. More specifically it is charged that the churches individually, and the Christian church as a whole, have been remiss in their responsibility and have quite failed to take advantage of the opportunity which is everywhere before them.

This point of view is of interest, because, as is well known, the moment a religious leader, or a church as a whole, undertakes to deal with questions of conduct as they affect business and politics, such leader, or such church, is told that religion should be kept separate from business and from political affairs. Fortunately there are happy exceptions to this rule, and some tendency has developed in recent years to allow that a church ought to interest itself in public affairs and ought to emphasize ethical conduct on the part of its members in particular, and also to stress the importance of good conduct on the part of all.

As far as this attitude on the part of religion has been accepted it has tended to lead to a recognition of the underlying difficulty in our social life and has helped to remove the assumed separation between religion and other elements in the social structure. In fact just so far as current thought permits religion to enter into business, into politics, and into public life in general, it at once helps to blot out the assumed line of separation between religion and civic affairs.

This relation of religion to social and political life touches directly upon a very delicate subject, especially in America. The religious history of the American people is largely an outcome of assumed separation between the state and the religious activities of the people. That separation is ordinarily assumed not only as basic in American thought but also as intrinsically necessary if religion is to be free and the religious life is to have its own proper development.

We are beginning to be aware, however, that this assumed separation is not only fictitious in fact but, also, that so long as there is insistence upon separation between the two, and that religion shall not concern itself with business and public life, the very purpose of religion in the world is defeated, and it fails to accomplish that for which it is preeminently qualified to serve. At one and the same time there is a tendency both to require of religion that it leaven the social lump and that it remain distinct from the social lump.

One sees then that a change in attitude is inevitable, if we are to deal with the moral problems which we face, and are to find an actual solvent for the difficulties before us in the field of conduct. To be sure, the formal separation between religion and state which has become so thoroughly woven into the fabric of American thinking is not to be changed easily. Very likely this separation may persist in form for an indefinite period. At the same time, it may be that less emphasis will be placed on this formal separation and more attention be given to the inherent unity of life which is at the basis of religion as well as of social affairs in general. At least until this is done our ethical problems will remain.

This is apparent enough as soon as we look underneath the surface and discover how it comes about that a religious leader can, as a business executive, violate principles of conduct which his own formal standards condemn; how otherwise good citizens can disregard scientifically assured views of the liquor traffic; how, everywhere, reputable citizens can disre-

gard traffic regulations and other formal requirements which are definitely written into law.

Obviously the quality which is lacking in life is the capacity for self-control, moreover a self-control that understands the moral elements in the problems which must be faced and is willing to recognize these moral elements as something even more binding than formal legislation. Here is the crux of the matter. Until there is recognition of the underlying essentials of good conduct we shall only travel away from our goal by increasing the number of mere regulations as a remedy for the evils which are apparent. If there is to be a real change for the better, it will be necessary for a generation of business men to be developed who, of their own accord, recognize the binding force of moral justice in preference to business exigencies, and who are controlled by those moral ideals in the conduct even of business itself. There is little prospect that social ills, such as indulgence in intoxicating liquors, will be removed until steps have been taken for the training of youth in such ways as to make ethical ideals the guiding force in everyday conduct. There is little prospect that life on the highways will be much more sacred than at present, until less attention is given to mechanical regulations and there is more common endeavor, on the part of both the people in general and those who make the laws, to stimulate, and eventually to develop, a sense of fairness and a resulting type of good conduct apart from mere highway regulations.

There should be no attempt to minimize the difficulties of the problem as it stands, nor is there ground for consolation in halfway remedies. Already the superficial has far too long been employed in place of that which is basic and vital. It is obviously good conduct which we desire. No less obviously, when the matter is faced seriously, good conduct will arrive only when we recognize the source of such conduct and adapt our methods to the end in view.

So far as this end is to be achieved anywhere in the near

future its achievement clearly depends upon the action of those who feel the need and are willing to face the task. This is a call for service on the part of religious leaders who, at the same time that they are religious, are impressed with the supreme significance of the highest type of conduct recognized in the moral field. This call comes to ministers of the gospel, and offers opportunity for leadership in a field which has been too often neglected hitherto. It is a call indeed to all those in the churches who are ready to unite definitely their religious experience with their other affairs, and to conduct themselves constantly not only so as to recognize this unity, but also so as to employ everywhere the highest ideals which religion or other experiences may furnish.

The call comes no less to those who are the teachers of youth and who have in a very marked way the opportunity for the service which society at the present time needs in the field of conduct. One is quite aware that this service is no part of the recognized course of study in school life. It is possible for a teacher to ignore ethical responsibility. So long as a teacher does this, however, just so long the highest privilege of instruction is passed without use.

History everywhere furnishes examples of the ideas here sketched. A supreme example, somewhat familiar to every one, is the life of the Israelitish people. Among all the peoples of the past, the Israelitish nation is perhaps the finest example of an influence for social conduct of a high type. That Israelitish life was characterized to a remarkable degree by legislation undertaking to deal with the details of conduct. If, however, we look back to the history for the sources of good conduct among the Israelites, we shall not find them in the national legislation. With one accord we are aware that those who really made the nation and who were the means of preserving it were the men whom we call the prophets, men relatively little concerned with legal forms, but intensely interested in the principles of life itself; who recognized that these principles in no way

separate religion from life as a whole, but, instead, utilize all that religion can offer for purifying life and making it what it ought to be.

To be sure, one is not disposed to think of the Israelitish people as a complete example for the twentieth century. Any one acquainted with history is quite accustomed to the idea that nothing from the earlier periods of mankind can serve as a full example for the needs of the present generation. It is worth while, however, to take into account, and to take into account seriously, that which, as we now know, was the saving quality of a great people. If we do this we shall recognize at once that life is one, and that the conduct which we seek will be achieved only as we recognize that unity, and attempt to develop life in accordance with it.

It is possible to remove the question-mark from conduct only as we give attention seriously to the essential elements of good conduct, and are not afraid to banish the mere forms, which so long as they are our guide, prevent us from reaching our moral goal.

WHO'S WHO IN THIS ISSUE

We are again favored this quarter with a brief discussion of the new book of A. N. Whitehead of Harvard, *Process and Reality,* by Dr. George Boas, Associate Professor of Philosophy in Johns Hopkins University. Readers will remember that Doctor Boas is the author of *The Major Traditions of European Philosophy,* Harper and Brothers, which volume was reviewed in the October Quarterly. In the same issue of the Quarterly Doctor Boas presented a discussion of the great work of A. S. Eddington, *The Nature of the Physical World.*

Charles Luther Williams, Professor-Emeritus of the Department of English Literature, Denison University, Granville, Ohio, presents a paper that is itself a happy illustration of his theme. No one can be in doubt as to what Professor Williams means to say, even if he may hesitate to agree with the ideas so tersely expressed. A multitude of the writer's friends among our readers will be delighted to read "Being Understood as a Speaker or Writer." Mr. Williams is an Alumnus of Princeton and of Crozer.

A letter was written by the Editor accepting the article herewith printed, after its author, Dr. Owen P. Eaches, had, unknown to him, passed away. Doctor Eaches is too well known to most of our readers to need any form of introduction. He seemed especially interested in having this paper appear in print, and many who sympathize with his approach will be glad to be able to read it. Doctor Eaches was approaching ninety years of age when he wrote it. Though conservative in spirit he was ever seeking fresh ways of seeing and stating the truth, as this paper shows.

THOUGH a member of the Faculty of Crozer, now in his second year, this is the first time Professor William Roy McNutt has contributed an article to the QUARTERLY. He deals with a timeless topic that bears on questions long considered but never more appropriate than just now. He is an alumnus of, and received his D. D. degree from, Ottawa University, Kansas; he also is an A. M. of University of Pennsylvania, 1909. Successful in the pastorate he was in Y. M. C. A. army work in France, and was called to his professorship here from the First Baptist Church in Worcester, Massachusetts, after twelve years of resultful service there.

REARED in Missouri, Horace Thomas Houf, is a graduate of Crozer Seminary, 1914, B. D., and an A. M., University of Pennsylvania, 1915. After additional graduate study in the University of Chicago, he served as Pastor of Baptist churches, notably at Granville, Ohio, seat of Denison University. From 1923 to 1928 he was President of Rio Grande College, Ohio. In 1929 this college conferred the honorary degree of L. H. D. At present he is Associate Professor of Philosophy in Ohio University, teaching courses in Ethics and Religion. He is author of *Real Living and God's Help.*

PROFESSOR STEWART G. COLE, now in Europe employing his sabbatical year's leave from teaching in enlarged study, favors us with an article on "The Cultural Pattern of Our Inherited Christianity." The article, with the exception of the last paragraph, is the content of the introductory chapter of a book.

HENRY FELTON HUSE is pastor of the North Haven, Maine, Baptist (Community) Church, a graduate of Brown University and Newton Theological Institution. For thirty years a pastor in Maine, he has been actively engaged in many forms of endeavor and keeps abreast of the new movements

in thought, the last in science and philosophy, and is an intelligent leader—therefore.

Frank Grant Lewis will be recognized as Librarian in Crozer. The correlation of religion and conduct is treated frankly and critically and is always a timely topic. The author thinks it is of supreme importance.

NOTES AND CURRENT DISCUSSIONS

SPENSER B. MEESER

JUST at present there is much emphasis on the need of a world-view which shall endure the test of science; and religion is minded that to this demand must be added a harmony with philosophy. Although religion is as certainly an integral in " the whole " as physical fact, and value is as of great moment as existential realities, neither science has considered itself under bonds to meet the religion test in the past, nor has philosophy seen that its " whole " is only a part if religion be ignored. Among " the outstanders " in science, it is noteworthy, there is a much more hospitable attitude toward the religion-minded. That another attitude is characterizing others among the scientists is easily seen and can as easily be mistaken for the scientific conclusion that God, the soul, and immortality are only mental projections. It is already a fact that when one asks " What does science teach? " the answer must be, " The science of whom? What scientist? " Science is suffering from sectarian divisions, and it is time the warring factions looked toward scientific unity (!).

And this is more than a joke. For theoretic science, like theology in its realm, not only may have its authority questioned, but scientific progress may be retarded as religious progress is halted. Practical Science has its exactions in the realm of things, and theoretic science in the realm of thought. Philosophy refuses to abandon its prerogative as censor and critic of the postulates and the hypotheses of science, and though the criticism is sometimes resented philosophy has successfully challenged the " conclusions " of science as the amendments of earlier scientific theory have been made. For philosophy has its exactions as well, imposed on all the disciplines, religion as well as science, art as well as literature.

So religion has its claims to consideration. Both philosophy and science have often either ignored these claims or denied them. Religion is claimed as a phenomenon of the natural order; or it is, as we say, not explained but explained away, denied as a category; and the apparent problem and contradiction solved after the manner in which the earliest Greek philosophers met the problem of the one and the many, permanence and change, sameness and difference, by denying one factor in the problem and treating it as illusion. As the earlier Christians solved the problem of the Church's faith in the person of Jesus as somehow human-divine, the docetics postulating that the human was illusion and later others doing the same with the divine.

But religion exacts of science and philosophy what many learned refuse to yield that religion is reality, an integer in the whole which these disciplines propose to explain; and of their world views, that they consist with *all* the facts. *Religion is commerce with reality,* an initial Reality; and a world-view which ignores this Reality, which *may* at least be ultimate, is judged by all rational thinkers as essentially deficient.

And this fact is being recognized and conceded. The Captains of science, the investigators in the front-line trenches, no longer say, "Ne plus ultra," and recognize the inadequacy, ultimately, of the physical antecedents to explain the universe. They may not be willing to affirm what or what is the character of that "More Beyond"; but they may, and some do, not only admit the "More" but affirm it is rational to believe in that infinite source, which religion names God, and with which its devotees claim to have commerce. We can and need ask no more of these captains. As for the rank and file they too will follow.

WHICH suggests the next question: How long will it take for the belated in philosophy and science to catch up with their leaders on the front line?

There are still explicit or implicit materialists and mechanists among them, although physics has dematerialized matter, and forefront philosophical physicists have said that "materialism" is impossible as a world-view. The present-day mechanists seem not to have noted that the category "*machine*" is so definitely, etymologically, and figuratively teleological that it stands in absolute contradiction to the end they have in view—the denial of creative purposive Mind in the universe. "Machine" has no such possible meanings or implications for philosophy if once the real nature of a machine is appreciated. A machine is never anything if not a mind's way of achieving an end, a way of achievement which releases mind and hand for freer activity in seeking other ends. The order and apparent mechanisms of the universe, rather than exclude creative, purposive Mind, are the indices of such mind; and the more pervasive these mechanisms are found to be, the more conclusive the evidence of the universal immanent active Mind.

But beyond this is the newer evidence that machine order in the universe fails to verify itself as omnipresent. There is a principle of contingency at work, call it with others a principle of variation (a machine never varies) or call it a principle of spontaneity. The unpredictability of the activities and sequence of living forms has long defeated biologist and sociologists in their efforts to achieve status as natural or exact sciences; and predictability *has* been the test of such a science. And psychology! What distortions and disloyalties have accompanied the efforts of psychologists to achieve such a status.

For here, in psychology, is still another principle of activity which puts predictability utterly beyond attainment, in the case of an individual soul, and is only approximately to be reached in the case of groups of such. That is, there is what might be called the principle of personality or the principle of will.

But yet again, have we not now to recognize the claim of the physicist that even in the physical universe this test of predictability is questionable; that the agelong belief in the static

relation of cause and effect, so far as an inevitable sequence is concerned, can no longer be maintained with absolute assurance. It is even denied. The presence of a principle of contingency is recognized, and determinism, even in the physical realm, is qualified. There is ever an elusive element in all the activities of the universe, another category than those in which men have found adequate explanations. But this for the physicist!

Perhaps there are but few militant materialists and only a fading army of mechanists and these the lesser breed of scholars. It is nearly a quarter of a century since Wilhelm Ostward declared in his Ingersoll 1906 lecture on Immortality that:

> It must be restated . . . because as I have been maintaining for the last ten years, the matter-and-motion theory (or scientific materialism) has outgrown itself, and must be replaced by another theory, to which the name of " Energetics " has been given.

The mass of judgments to the same intent that have followed have rather overcome any militancy on the part of such as are still explicit in their materialism; but many who agree with these judgments in a formal way, and have repudiated the theory, are still advocates of views based upon and developed from the primary assumptions of that theory. The remaining task is the recasting of the various disciplines that have been so grounded, for such is the basis of much of the formal opposition of these disciplines to religion. Naturalism, Materialism, Mechanism are world-views based on this postulate, and are maintained when the postulate has been shown to be no longer tenable.

Theologians sometimes rush in where scientists and philosophers fear to tread. Some months ago when Professor Bridgman of Harvard announced that science had reached its limit with the electron he generously warned the theologians not to think that thereby they were warranted in going farther and positing God. We then suggested, in this department, that his

counsel was gratuitous if not impertinent. But there is a way of running to conclusions from the admissions of science and philosophy not only not conceded by the proponents, but not quite justified in fact.

Some years ago when it came to common knowledge that the physicists had disintegrated the atom, resolving matter into forms of energy, we heard a learned and skilled gentleman read a paper in which he found in this resolution of matter into energy the demonstration of the reality of the spiritual and all that faith in the spiritual implies. Materialism was then still regnant, the implacable foe of the spiritual; and science and religion were facing each other in the ring. It seemed to him that the dematerialization of matter into an equivalence in energy meant the end of the dualism of matter and mind, and the identification of the ultimate energy with spirit. All is ultimately spirit, and the implicates, religion and morals, were in reason and likewise in the physical universe now justified.

It is indeed true that the dualism of *matter and energy* is gone; but, as our reader of the paper needed to be reminded, a dualism more subtle, more nearly ultimate, stubbornly remains, viz., namely that of energy *and* spirit or mind. By no stretch of logical imagination (whatever may be the conclusion from the inability of representative imagination to picture either energy or spirit), can energy, ether waves, electricity, or emanation be identified with mind or spirit. What remains after the dematerialization of matter is *not one substance*—energy—spirit—but two immaterial substances, spirit *and* energy; or possibly some one unknown substance of which spirit and energy are varied manifestations or aspects—so we may think if we insist on being monists.

However eager the religion-minded may be to find confirmations of their faith; and however faulty the logic of the speculative scientist may be which seems to justify their favorable conclusions, they must move with caution. And Prof. A. S. Eddington reminds us in his little great book *Science and the*

Unseen World that though materialism is dead, other philosophies with a virtually equivalent outlook have been offered, such as a belief in the dominance of law in the scientific sense, a belief filled with confusion because of confused conceptions of "law." And, though he holds that the deterministic view of things as a comprehensive explanation is a lower and partial accounting, one must not think that the situation is met until some rationale of the apparent determinisms in the world is found and finds acceptance.

"THEOPHOBIA" is what a brilliant writer, William Sullivan, in a recent *Atlantic Monthly,* calls that modern anti-religious temper with which so many of the proposers of substitutes for religion seem to be afflicted. A madness it is, he intimates, which takes the form suggested by this newly coined word (if such it is)—a sort of passion against the idea or reality of God, or anything that may be thought of as God. With some the phobia vents itself in the form of a religion without a God; with others it rejects religion along with the dismissed God, if no adequate substitute for Him can be found with which to relate religion.

What will constitute an adequate substitute for God so far as religion is concerned is a question which may arouse considerable discussion. A reviewer of *Process and Reality* by Alfred N. Whitehead in a discussion of the volume in this (April, 1930) QUARTERLY writes as follows:

> . . . the unity of the universe is expressed in the antithesis, God-World, whose separation is verbal rather than real. God for Mr. Whitehead [p. 374] "is that actual entity from which each temporal concrescence receives that initial aim from which its self-causation starts," which means I suppose that God is all potential possibilities which—this is the natural assumption of a logician—have an organic unity. Whether such a God will answer our religious needs, I shall not venture to affirm or deny. . . But certainly such a God looks highly different from the God of the Hebraic-Christian tradition, and it is a grave question whether one could pray to Him, or worship Him.

Certainly it would be difficult at best to do either, and yet worship and prayer seem to be indisputable and essential elements in religion, however broadly conceived, and however mingled and confused with other factors.

No one will identify this fear or madness, or aversion to God or the idea of God with the Biblical and religion reverence. "The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom." It is "a phobia," fear with aversion which crashes against the common belief, and in the main is contemptuous toward the idea. Often, in illy concealed resentment it sneers at those who still believe in God as well as at their reactions to their faith as expressed in worship and type of living. In other instances it cannot suppress admiration and consent to the implications of religion with a God, especially those of the Christian religion. So it appropriates the ideals, the values, and the activities of such a religion, critically excluding the crudities and outgrown practises as the intelligent devotees of Christianity already have done, groups them under an engaging title and, ignoring the fact that faith in God is the dynamic motive of these elements of religion, offers the cult as a substitute for religion.

At present a phase of mob-psychology seems to be making this theophobia epidemic among religious educationists and educators in general. A recent convention attended by a critical observer seemed to him to be infected with this madness. So much so that the several participants in the program who still held to a religion with a God were accounted old-fashioned by the group. It is almost irresistible to hark back to Paul in Romans 1: 19ff., but we refrain. (Moffatt. New Translation.)

These "religious" cults built of the social implications of the Christian religion are like fruit separated from the organisms of the trees which produced them. Or better, they are the activities produced by the dynamic of a religion with a God,

the momentum of a creative faith, no longer in gear with God. Their advocates continue the habit-activities of a faith once theirs, and conceive these activities as still in gear with their "new faith," or their lack of faith. Multitudes of men are running in their moral and spiritual life out-of-gear—coasting—is it down-hill? With apologies to the poets the Managing Editor ventures a few lines which reflect both his judgment and feeling, as follows:

The Doubt of Doubt

If it should turn out that there is no God:
If God Himself should come and say, "There is no God—
I am the great Illusion, the Creature of your mind,
And you, conceiving Me, are great as I"—
    First tempted then my soul would be
    To flout His word who speaks to me.

If it should turn out that, Narcissuslike
I had, despite my creed, been worshiping myself,
Had made a God of my vain glorious conceits,
And had but fellowshiped the offspring of my mind—
    No pride of power my mind could feel,
    Its best had proved its best unreal.

If it should turn out that this "all I have"—
The "all" so long ascribed to love in God,
Had been the fruit of my lone soul's device,
And I the maker of it all, as God—
    In scorn of pride, my soul no more
    Could kneel to worship and adore.

If it should turn out that all life's prayer,
And all its hopes and anguish to be good,
Had been the reaching after that I had already reached,
The chase, in circling fury, of the tail I was—
    I'd think myself had been a fool,
    Full worthy of self-ridicule.

If it should turn out—but nought itself turns out;
Some Turner spins the whirring wheels of change;
And so, you see, 'twould take a God to disprove God,
And show that His divinity is but an empty dream.
He is at once the Fact, and of the Fact the proof.
He is the Warp of certainty; He is the Woof.

Thou Real in all our unreality!
Thou Soul of all our lesser souls possessed!
We would not seek Thee had we not already found,
Nor cling to Thee, if not in fact so surely bound.
For Thou, O God! art ever real,
Whom even change and doubt reveal.

BOOK REVIEWS

Jeremiah the Prophet: A Study in Personal Religion. RAYMOND CALKINS. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1930.

ANOTHER study in Jeremiah is far from superfluous, though in recent years the book has commanded the attention of a galaxy of German and English writers. This volume justifies itself in its difference of method. Written by a preacher, it is not a compilation of sermons, and while written by a careful student has little or nothing that is purely technical. Part of most of the eighteen chapters is occupied with an interpretation and evaluation of the message of the Prophet in its historical setting, and the other half presents critical notes that help over some of the difficulties.

The author, who insists on keeping modern technical scholarship at least within hailing distance, has levied heavy tribute on all the important recent writers on this theme. He exercises his right of private judgment as to critical theories and that usually with a prejudice toward the conservative position. He has a just appreciation of Jeremiah, as the greatest of the prophets, and reiterates the conviction that no men like the Old Testament prophets were ever found amongst other peoples. No doubt many who do not care to wade through the volumes of Skinner and Smith, will find this book profitable reading.

I. G. MATTHEWS.

The Mind of St. Paul—A Psychological Study. ARTHUR HOLMES, A. M., Ph. D., Professor of Psychology, University of Pennsylvania. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1929. Pp. 263. $2.00.

THIS is a very difficult book for a layman to review, for Doctor Holmes is writing not as an historian but as a psychologist. Much in the book is highly interesting and to me quite unknown. But final judgment as to its contribution as a study in psychology must come from the professional psychologist. It is perhaps not unfriendly to suggest that the author's knowledge of psychology is probably more profound than his knowledge of Paul. The fundamental difficulty in this volume, and it is shared by most psychological studies of Biblical characters, is an unwarrantable use of the sources. To treat the Biblical narratives as if they were clinical reports may be highly diverting, but it is dangerous in the extreme. The reader again and again gains the impression that the author, like the valorous musician who played the note only to find it a flyspeck, deduces

his most important results from casual writing and paper description. Very possibly if the experiences and words of Paul as recounted in the book of Acts could be regarded as accurate in every shade of detail they might be used as the basis of some such diagnosis as Doctor Holmes reaches. To be sure in the opening chapter he remarks that our sources of information for Paul's life and acts are found in his Epistles, in the book of Acts, and in tradition, and very properly concludes that the first of these three is the most significant. Yet as the book unfolds it is Acts which supplies most of the material—and how could it be otherwise since it is Paul's conversion that engages his chief attention?

The point on which Doctor Holmes and his pedissequi come to shipwreck is revealed in the following paragraphs:

> The discrepancies that exist among these sources are many and varied. It seems best for us to follow what is most generally accepted by the best scholarship of the day. Since the most generally accepted conclusions appear in works of reference, we have referred to such works very freely. Since the Revised Version of the Bible contains the most familiar statements, and because the aim of this work is to furnish religious workers with a practical aid, we have quoted the English Bible, mentioning the Greek and Hebrew words only when necessary.
>
> Such a procedure does not seek to ignore the problems of literary, historical, and textual criticism involved in any study of St. Paul. But in a psychological study, many items highly important to theology and Biblical interpretation may be and sometimes must be omitted from consideration. A man's character stands out above the thousands of incidents he experiences and the millions of words he utters. Only critical incidents and significant words count in forming an estimate of him (pp. 23f.).

Few would disagree, but the difficulty lies in the fact that the average psychologist, and Doctor Holmes is apparently no exception, being an amateur in the field, is not in a position to determine critically which of the incidents and words which appear to him, and rightly, as "critical" and "significant" are legitimate. Were it certain, as I have already said, that the accounts are cameo-accurate—the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth—a diagnosis might be possible. Again, if this assumption is not made, but an equally hazardous one is made, namely, that the accounts although the composition of the author are yet produced by a man who is carefully weighing each detail he adds, then the results might be examined and a diagnosis made, not of the subject of the study but of the author who composed it—his view of conversion and the like. But few historians would accept either hypothesis for Acts. Accordingly the laborious analysis of such material by the psychologists can hardly be expected to avoid the danger which as a matter of fact most of them have experienced.

The danger is less when instead of the narrative about a man (as Acts) his own writings (as Paul's letters) are considered. But even here the investigator need take to heart the sententious observation of the author of Second Peter that in the epistles of our beloved brother Paul "are some things hard to be understood, which the ignorant and unstedfast wrest, as they do also the other scriptures, unto their own destruction." A particularly glaring illustration of this danger is found in the unwarranted, if partially excusable, use of the seventh chapter of Romans to buttress the view of Paul's agony and unrest in his pre-Christian days.

All of which is a somewhat lengthy, but devout plea that psychologists, if they must practise at all, exert their energies on laboratory specimens and allow the dead to rest in peace.

MORTON S. ENSLIN.

The New Morality. DURANT DRAKE, Professor of Philosophy at Vassar College. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1929. Pp. xii, 359. Price, $2.50.

IT is no novelty to read another book beginning with a query, which twenty-five years ago would have been arresting: "Why should we be moral?" The novelty of the present volume consists in the fact that the author is confident that he knows the answer to the question he propounds. And this, in spite of the fact that he is a professor of philosophy! And more than that, his answer is profoundly common sense. Morality is necessary, for it makes for human happiness; and so the new morality "consciously aims to secure the maximum of attainable happiness for mankind." It is very easy to fulminate about the necessity of duty, without the slightest recognition that there may be—and usually is—a decided question as to what duty is. The idea that things ought to be done or left undone because of some intrinsic or innate goodness or badness lurking in them, or because some voice or book said, "Thou shalt" or "Thou shalt not," is no less silly because it has often been expressed. If any criterion is to be set, it is one which concerns itself with the consequences of actions, with the recognized fact that some things tend to cause pain, others the reverse. Actually, "if conscious beings had no capacity for pain or pleasure, for sorrow or joy, there would be no sense in preferring one act to another, no meaning to morality, no possibility of any sort of *evaluation* at all."

To some this frank avowal will seem to be a gesture—and more than a gesture, an inducement—to let down all the bars and to make one's appetites the final judge. But he will be very perverted, or at least very

obtuse, who can read this book and still imagine this to be Professor Drake's purpose. For while happiness for the individual is legitimate and should not be interfered with save for very real reasons, any true morality must concern itself in safeguarding us against the immediate and the selfish. Self-indulgence is not the aim of life. It is not wrong, as the Puritans thought, because carnal pleasures are sinful, but only in so far as it stands in the way of our own fundamental needs or our duties to others. "We want no unnecessary pinching of life, no asceticism, no intolerance. But life sooner or later demands sacrifices from us all; and those sacrifices we must be ready and willing to make." But the sacrifice is not for the sake of sacrificing, but because the sacrifice will make possible a more abundant life, not alone for ourselves but for others as well. The ultimate goal of "the new morality" is the greatest attainable happiness for all the peoples of the earth.

Thus in the first five chapters a crystal clear incentive for a true morality is set forth, and the standards set whereby conduct may be criticized. Then follows the bulk of the book, the trenchant and constructive criticism of what is termed, and happily, "Some Questionable Aspects of Current Morality." A list of the questions discussed reveals the practical and timely nature of the discussion. And in each case the treatment is eminently fair and pointed. Professor Drake's wide experience as a student of human nature and his acquaintance with its literature yield fruit that every individual who would flatter himself that he is even passably educated—to say nothing of those who would be leaders of opinion in these ticklish times—would do well to ponder.

Self-indulgence and luxury, lawlessness and crime, intoxication and bootlegging, marital failures, irresponsible parenthood, corrupt politics, selfish business, privilege, suppression of opinion, poisoned journalism, demoralizing art and literature, dogmatism and indoctrination, race prejudice, war, isolationism.

Much in the book is disquieting, but not because of any cheap sensationalism on the part of the writer. The disquiet comes because every honest reader will be forced to admit the indictment is just. Not that Professor Drake is unduly pessimistic, rather he is disturbed, and many will join him, that with the remedy for so many of the abuses ready to hand, we yet go smugly on, satisfied with our previous inherited opinions instead of developing a passionate interest in helping to win a wider, securer, and more lasting happiness for men.

Morton S. Enslin.

The Real Jesus—What He Taught: What He Did: Who He Was. CHARLES FISKE, Bishop of Central New York, and BURTON SCOTT EASTON, Professor of the Interpretation and Literature of the New Testament, General Theological Seminary. New York and London: Harper & Brothers. 1929. Pp. ix, 261. Price, $2.50.

THE task of producing a volume which will even in a limited degree reveal the nature of the founder of Christianity is a staggering, almost thankless, task. The author is almost certain to come to grief either on Scylla or Charybdis. If he attempts dispassionately to view Jesus as he would any other figure of the past and to write what he sees, not what he desires to see, he is sure of but two results: the charge of bias and subjectiveness from those in a position to read his book, and a little vituperation, then complete neglect, from every one else. On the other hand, if he attempts a popular "Life" for the pious, who are usually assumed, albeit probably mistakenly, to be eagerly awaiting the opportunity of buying such books, he usually succeeds in achieving nothing but a tiresome rehearsal of a theme told infinitely better by the Gospel writers themselves.

But now a new and novel attempt is made. Not one but two authors in conjunction assay their skill—a bishop to supply piety and popular appeal, a technical expert to avoid too great a distortion of the facts. And really the result is vastly better than one might fearsomely expect, for no two men better adapted to double harness of such a sort could have been selected.

The book is not intended for experts, and will not be noticed by them. It does, however, tell in interesting and readable form the Gospel story, and, without a parade of scholarship, attempts very gently to make use of the "reasonably assured results of historic criticism." While frankness and unevasiveness characterize the writing, an extreme degree of skill is manifested in discussing—or sidestepping—such problems as the miracles, resurrection, and virgin birth. You can usually discover what the authors themselves believe, but you have to hunt to do it.

Whether it does portray the Real Jesus is open to some question, but the book is vastly better than most that attempt this task, and will and should be acceptable to a large circle of readers.

MORTON S. ENSLIN.

Mahatma Gandhi's Ideas. C. F. ANDREWS. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1930. Price, $3.00.

GANDHI has caught the imagination of the world, and for many reasons. He is interesting in himself; he is such a contrast to conventional modes

of living and thinking, that he excites curiosity, wonder, admiration, and even reverence. He becomes more interesting when viewed in the light of the conflicting social, economic, and moral forces that press upon him, and which he is trying to repel or to utilize for ends which seem to him supreme. Probably to most Westerners Gandhi is a mere name, a symbol of India's restlessness under British rule. To many he is a trophy of a triumphant Christian faith, an illustration of the certainty of the ultimate Christian conquest of India. To others he is a pathetic example of the futility of stressing certain virtues in solving economic problems inevitable in a changing social order. Indeed, Gandhi's person and career are so full of romance, of heroism, of tragedy, of commonplace simplicity combined with epic sublimity, that already he has occasioned a rather large body of literature. But this volume by his intimate personal friend of many years is a real contribution. It gives us a portrait of one whose features were but dimly seen before. The portrait is made lifelike by selecting passages from Gandhi's speeches and writings. The picture of the great Hindu reformer and patriot is framed in its religious, political, and economic environment, so that in a very real sense it becomes a "moving" picture. There is nothing static in the author's narrative. He writes with full knowledge of particular incidents in his hero's career, with warm love for his character, with realization of the forces against which he is struggling. If the reader desires a vivid portrayal of the revolution that is going on in India, in which Gandhi, the impersonation of "poor India," and the British Empire are the chief actors, C. F. Andrews' *Mahatma Gandhi's Ideas* is recommended.

The contents of the book are: Introduction, giving briefly in order of time the leading incidents in Gandhi's life. *Part I, The Religious Environment,* has nine chapters, under the following titles: I. The Background of Hinduism; II. The Hindu-Muslim Problem; III. The Christian Contact; IV. "The Place of Jesus"; V. The Ashram of Soul-force; VI. The Religious Meaning of Swadeshi; VII. The Teaching of Ahimsa; VIII. The Ethics of Khaddar; IX. "Our Shame and Theirs." *Part II, The Historical Setting,* has twelve chapters, with the following titles: X. A Confession of Faith, 1909; XI. Passive Resistance in South Africa; XII. Tolstoy Farm; XIII. Satyagraha in India; XIV. "To Every Englishman"; XV. "The Great Sentinel"; XVI. The Bombay Riots; XVII. Trial and Imprisonment; XVIII. The Fast at Delhi; XIX. The Women's Movement in India; XX. A Morning with Gandhi; XXI. Conclusion.

MILTON G. EVANS.

What Is Hell? Dean W. R. Inge and Others. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1930. Pp. 186.

The "others" are Sir Oliver Lodge, Abbot Butler, Warwick Deeping, J. E. C. Welldon, James Moffatt, Annie Besant, Sheila Kaye-Smith, W. E. Orchard, F. W. Norwood, G. Hay Morgan, Irwin Edman. This list of names assures a variety of opinions, ranging from popular traditional ecclesiastical idea of physical suffering after death, to the more reflective view, equally traditional, with those who, doubting post-mortem existence, believe that "Hell" is an inescapable moral reality in this present life. No one of the writers doubts the reality of Hell; they differ in their characterization of it geographically. With few exceptions they discuss the What, not the Where.

Dean Inge contributes a chapter, "What We Mean By Hell"; Sir Oliver Lodge, "The Reality of Hell"; Abbot Butler, "Hell and Purgatory"; Warwick Deeping, "Hell as Man's Consciousness of Failure"; Bishop J. E. C. Welldon, "The Nature of Punishment after Death"; Professor James Moffatt, "Hell and Hell"; Annie Besant, "Hell as a Training School"; Sheila Kaye-Smith, "Eternal Hell"; Rev. W. E. Orchard, "Hell: A Theological Exposition"; Rev. F. W. Norwood, "Changing Views"; G. Hay Morgan, "The Pains of Hell"; Professor Irwin Edman, "The Pagan's Hell."

A variety of desires will be satisfied in reading this volume, but quite certainly the desire to *know* what a post-mortem Hell is will not be one of them. The significance of the chapters it not their exact description of Hell here or hereafter, but in their insights as to what it is in human nature that has created the idea of Hell, whatever its actual content, or wherever experienced.

Milton G. Evans.

Christian Reunion in Ecumenical Light. Francis J. Hall, D. D. New York: Macmillan Company. 1930. Pp. 150.

This book, with its Foreword by Bishop William T. Manning, of New York, and by an author who was a "member of the World Conference Commission of the American Episcopal Church, and co-opted delegate to the Lausanne Conference of 1927," may be taken as the authoritative and official expression of the Protestant Episcopal Church of America upon questions of the reunion of all Christian bodies of the world.

We do well, then, to listen to the author.

> I have become more and more convinced [he says] that the only possible basis of full Christian Unity is that laid down by the American Bishops in 1886, "the

return of all Christian Communions to the principles of unity exemplified by the undivided Catholic Church during the first stages of its existence."

Of course Doctor Hall recognizes the difficulties in the way of achieving such a glorious unity. He admits that he has "come increasingly to realize how grave were the abuses and provocations which caused the Protestant revolt of the sixteenth century." He even confesses that "much sincere and zealous serving of Christ prevails among Protestants," and that it is necessary "to do justice to certain principles emphasized by them." For which other Protestants may well be very grateful. But far more, Doctor Hall actually states: "I was much edified by my contact with Protestant leaders at Lausanne," for which remarkable experience and graciously enthusiastic confession these Protestant leaders are no doubt sincerely and devoutly thankful.

Of the "requirements for reunion," the author finds two groups, the intrinsic and the extrinsic.

In the former are such requirements as these: (1) "Practical acceptance of the whole historic Faith"; (2) "Acknowledgment of the teaching authority of the universal Church"; (3) Acceptance of "the ancient sacramentalism of the Church"; (4) Recognition of "the threefold ministry of bishops, priests, and deacons"; (5) "The perpetuation of the ministerial priesthood."

Among the extrinsic requirements are the following: (1) The central authority of the Church; (2) Conformity in "Eucharistic worship and sacramental ministrations"; (3) "Outside the common Eucharistic worship . . . explicit allowance of any diversity that is consistent with Christian principles and decent order"; (4) "Some continuing ecumenical machinery," which might be some form of remodeled "Roman primacy."

When one beholds this reconstructed united church of Doctor Hall's he is constrained to exclaim first of all: "What a beautifully strong Episcopal Church for the entire world of Christendom!" And then one asks: Why was the church originally organized, to embalm the Truth or to save men? And why reunite the church, to conserve this Faith or to bring in the Kingdom of Righteousness? Can not such men as Doctor Hall see that throughout its history the church has changed, and always will change, in order to do the Master's will, redeem men in all their varying circumstances and conditions of life? As Jesus asked: Which is the more sacred, institutions, doctrines, creeds, or people?

R. E. E. Harkness.

The Social Sources of Denominationalism. H. Richard Niebuhr, Ph. D. New York: Henry Holt and Company. 1929. Pp. 304. Price, $2.50.

Denominations have been conditioned by social circumstances. The sources of their theological variations are interwoven with the economic, racial, sectional, and national exigencies. The definition of religious truth has been dependent upon social factors. But the importance of social determinants, while recognized in the history of nations, has too often been disregarded in the writing of denominational and sectarian history. A socio-historical explanation of the rise and spread of denominations is a need which is becoming an essential part of all thoughtful consideration of the nature of present-day religious problems.

The first and last chapters of this book seem to indicate not only that the author has an intellectual acquaintance with the major issues that face Christianity in America today but that he has a conviction as to the course Christianity ought now to take. For him denominationalism represents the moral failure of Christianity.

> And unless the ethics of brotherhood can gain the victory over this divisiveness within the body of Christ it is useless to expect it to be victorious in the world. But before the church can hope to overcome its fatal division it must learn to recognize and to acknowledge the secular character of its denominationalism (p. 25).

Unity of the churches is expressly advocated.

Any attempt to evaluate the conclusions of the author should be postponed until after a careful reading of the eight chapters placed between the first and the last. They contain more than one is likely to anticipate. If one knows Max Weber, Troeltsch, and Tawney familiar thoughts will recur with more significant emphases; if not, he will, nevertheless, be impressed with the historical illustrations employed to show how the major denominations arose and how they have functioned until modern times. In its rise Christianity was a religion of the disinherited; so also were Montanism, Lollardy, Waldensianism. The Reformation churches of Germany and England came out of the unrest of the socially disinherited. But the tendency has been for these churches to be transformed into middle-class institutions, thereby creating conditions for the birth of more sects. On the other hand, Lutheranism, Anglicanism, and Presbyterianism are examples of State Churches which emerged as institutions of the middle class.

Conflicts leading to schism within the denominations of America likewise have social causes. On the advancing frontier faith was different from the religion of the established communities of the East. The rural-urban conflict in recent years has been more or less responsible for the

theological battles of Modernism and Fundamentalism. The economic forces dominant in stirring up the Civil War divided the sects on the slavery issue and the churches on the political issue. Furthermore, immigration and the color line have affected the religious climate of the country to the increase of conflicts and compromises.

After reading the book we turn anew to the author's proposition: "The history of schism has been a history of Christianity's defeat" (p. 264).

RAYMOND HIGHTOWER.

New Views of Evolution. G. P. CONGER.—Philosophy for the Layman Series. New York: The Macmillan Company.

AN invaluable book for the layman—meaning of course the layman in science and philosophy. Simple (as can be) in statement, clear and without confusing technical terms, it must at once be recognized as accurate, the product of a clear mind and therefore singularly valuable.

Such interminable confusion exists in most minds as to what evolutionism really proposes and advocates; so many misrepresentations are made by those ignorant of the theory and the fair and just inferences that may or may not be made in other realms of thought and human interest, that one wishes that every thoughtful man might possess and study this volume. Having read it, one is without excuse who misrepresents or misinterprets the evolutionary hypothesis.

It is a brief presentation, an outline indeed. It argues little. It presents conclusions readily understood. It proposes no dogmatic assertions as to whether the theory is friendly or inimical to religion. It recognizes that there are schools of interpreters of evolution, and affirms that the theory does not confirm or necessitate any one of the interpretations; is indeed neither theistic nor antitheistic, and must be interpreted in the light of one's view, philosophically determined.

Many readers will welcome the concise presentation of the theory as applied to the inorganic as well as the organic, the social and religious as well as the philosophical forms. Fair treatment will be recognized and terse relevant criticisms valued and appreciated.

The only criticism we offer is that in treating of "The Evolution of Nervous Systems and Minds," Chapter VII, and especially in considering the theories of the relation of mind and body, scant justice is done the elder theories, while the author takes the opportunity to present his own assumption at length. This might be pardoned in view of the excellent work in other respects, if the assumption "made for the sake of simplicity and directness" were such as a layman would readily understand or

assimilate. Nevertheless he does not claim that evolutionism is tied up with the acceptance of his view in this regard. Moderate evolutionism could lend itself to a more animistic view with consistency.

SPENSER B. MEESER.

Immortability: An Old Man's Conclusions. S. D. MCCONNELL. New York: The Macmillan Company.

AS LONG ago as 1912 this author published his *Christianity, An Interpretation,* a soul-stirring and, to some, a soul-irritating volume, in several chapters of which he propounded the essential ideas of this new volume. Here, however, we have a more elaborated view, with some of the very recent, indeed ultra-modern notions of physics adduced in support of, and as furnishing a ground for his conception. "Immortability" is a word not in frequent use and may be of Doctor McConnell's own coinage. At all events it well represents his idea of conditional immortality; or potential immortality, to be more accurate.

The publishers justly announce that

> three claims to popular interest on behalf of "Immortability" are worth mentioning: (1) Its author is a man of 85. (2) It is an honest book which does not attempt to obscure the difficulties in the way of a belief in immortality by a smoke-screen of piety. (3) It attempts to remove one of the scientific objections to the faith in life after death—our inability to form a conception of how it can be accomplished —by a very timely use of ultra-modern notions of physics.

He rejects the idea that all men are natively immortal and insists that the only grounds for so thinking are equally valid for many lower animals. It is assumed that all living beings classed as man on physical grounds are also man on psychical grounds. This is not true, he claims, and immortality is to be looked for not at the point which separates man from brute, but at that which separates one kind of "man" and all the rest.

The theory proposed separates itself from earlier forms of conditional immortality in that they conceive immortality impressed on some from the outside, conferred on them in the eucharist, baptism, or by new birth upon acceptance of Christ. The condition is "extraneous," "arbitrary," "artificial."

"Potential immortality" or Immortability is the theory that life beyond is a biological process, which may also be a religious process, because it corresponds to an actual reality already existent.

Grounding his view in Evolutionism, he sees it possible for a continued personal or individual existence after death only as the soul is conceived as an organism developing values which are worth changing the natural order

for. For the human organism only truly moral values have that worth; and only those in whom the truly moral life develops have any hope of persisting.

But even in this case there remain questions that give pause to faith. How can we think of the existence and functioning of disembodied spirit? All analogy is against the faith. Here, upon the basis of most recent conceptions of the constitution of matter and the disintegration of its atoms into the "finer" ultimates, electrons, etc., he proposes the possibility that in the last analysis, matter is ultimately spiritual, or at least so "fine" that of it a moral personal being may build up, in a sort of spiritual biological process, a "body," fit for the functioning Spirit, after the coarser body we now possess has crumbled to dust. He thinks this the only possible rationale in view.

The elaboration of this view is worth following through consistencies and inconsistencies, good and questionable exegesis, and all the rest of the writing.

SPENSER B. MEESER.

Nature: Cosmic, Human and Divine. JAMES YOUNG SIMPSON. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.

THIS volume presents The Terry Lectures for 1929. The lecturer believes profoundly that the prodigious advance in knowledge in our time carries with it a concomitant peril, viz., the possible misuse of that knowledge because man's moral development has not kept pace with his growing control of the forces of Nature. He proposes a gigantic task—that of the consideration of the bearings of this knowledge on human life and thought in general.

Convinced that in these days we are passing through "a re-formation of thought" as profound as anything that might pass under that name, the author reports in fifty pages or more the latest thought of the most learned scientists as to the nature of the cosmos. He finds that the age-long process of the evolution of the inorganic is a continuous materialization of energy in some form or another; and energy, according to the physicist is simply that which "no man hath seen or can see at any time." Beyond this materialization the outstanding fact is that "there have eventuated beings that can weigh the stars, can tell them by name or number, and can fathom the secrets of organic development. Furthermore there is *reason to believe that man is in the presence of forces 'entirely unknown' to him, which have their origin in some other and entirely extraneous dimension.*"

Man, as the culmination of the evolutionary process and as having

spiritual capacity is "not merely the masterpiece of the process, but also its interpreter." Man gives meaning to the process and as such carries in himself a suggestion of his infinite worth, for the process has involved incalculable cost. Man is still in the making. The idea that human nature is fixed has little basis in fact. Indeed all the evidence points to a natural capacity in man *"for an Other-regarding life,"* which historically is in process of gradual development. "He can and will move toward a higher type of individual and social life, in which character will be the sole criterion."

In the third lecture on "Nature: Divine," noting that the doctrine of evolution and the disintegration of matter are statements of fact, the author seems to hasten to a common but questionable conclusion, or the use of a word in a loose sense which leads many to conclude that the old-time dualism is gone. By no stretch of logical imagination can energy, ether, electricity, or emanation be identified with spirit. What we have in the dematerialization of matter is *not one substance* "energy-spirit," but two immaterial substances—spirit *and* energy. But at least this is justifiable in view of modern physics with its view of matter as energy, viz., that it "has disposed very effectively of the old, and indeed of any materialism."

In a concrete discussion of the involvements of progress as set out in the theory of evolution some most serious defects of the mechanistic conception of natural processes are pointed out, and the need of some principle of spontaneity posited. The two principles are easily recognized and the dualism fronts us, but the author holds that if ever it is resolved "the probabilities are that the resolution will be in the direction of the priority of creative mind." The mind can form a picture and theory of the character, say of an electron; but there is no slightest evidence that it can be affirmed of the electron that it can do the same with mind.

Professor Simpson is insistent upon the limitations of Materialism and Mechanism, and claims that no explanation will ever satisfy the human reason that does not in some way make Mind of the essence of the process. Behaviorism he regards as one of those theories, of which Professor C. D. Broad has said, they are "so preposterously silly that only learned men could have thought of them."

For him, as for Eddington, "physics is no longer pledged to a scheme of deterministic law," for it more and more appears that the physical and psychical are different aspects of a Whole more psychical than physical, and that Whole, so far as we can conceive our planet related to it, "partakes of the characteristics that distinguish man at his highest." For the author

again this process is substantiating those moral values on which man is increasingly setting store.

So much and much more of equal value is found in this volume. Then to religion directly—religion which he defines as

> reaction to environment, but to an environment which in its subtler, deeper, more ultimate aspect is . . . realized to be spiritual. . .

This "religion" he conceives as a creative and redemptive energy, which has an intensive revelation in a Perfect Man. And thence—a theism and a Christology which must be left to the reader.

SPENSER B. MEESER.

The Universe Around Us. SIR JAMES JEANS. New York: The Macmillan Company.

BY one of the most distinguished of living scientists, this volume is written for the layman in natural science, especially in astronomy. No technical language, full of apt similes, he leads the reader through mysteries and the vastnesses of the universe—a fascinating story of the heavens which for some "declare the glory of God," and "show his handiwork." Herein one is conducted into the past into and before "the beginning," and, with equally interesting detail is led into the possibilities of the future.

What bearing this has on the beliefs and hopes of most readers is what this review is concerned with. Such are painfully reminded of how ecclesiastics have resented and resisted the findings of natural science. But this means no resentment on the part of the author. He recognizes "the main interest of astronomy is the desire to probe further into the past and future than the brief span of life permits. It is not only the intellectual interest, it has deeper roots and a more personal interest." As the author writes in the introduction, "Before he can understand himself, man must first understand the universe from which all his sense perceptions are drawn." And yet some are deeply sure that until man knows himself he can not well and wholly understand the universe, for some concepts and categories are needed in which to frame the universe, for the universe is compounded of more and other than sense impressions, and though such a philosophy may be dubbed anthropomorphic, personality, the crown of man's being, is, as is being urged so strenuously, an integral part of the Whole to be understood, and man's self is that which he knows first and best, however imperfectly he knows.

Nevertheless, though "Guessing has gone out of fashion in science" and science endeavors "to confine itself to ascertained facts and inferences,

which, so far as can be seen, follow unequivocally from them"; and while no antagonism to the elemental conclusions of religion appear, few intimations of a scientific confirmation of those truths of religion are offered. Sir James restricts himself to a presentation of the facts and frankly writes:

> We may well admit that science cannot at present hope to say anything final on the questions of human existence and human destiny. . . It is rare indeed for science to give a final "Yes" or "No" answer to any question propounded to her.

Better perhaps is a further word from this learned author. We feel like asking the question, Is then Science no more than a (?) question-mark? But he answers the unasked question.

> Science advances rather by providing a succession of approximations to the truth, each more accurate than the last, but each capable of endless degrees of higher accuracy.

But the book is not offered as a philosophy or theology. There remains to be said that if the "heavens" as known to the age of the psalmist led him to see therein the glory of God, and when he considered them to ask "What is man that Thou art mindful of him . . .?" then the vision of the marvel, the mystery, the vastness of space and the limitlessness of time, which Sir James so vividly represents in this volume, should to the reverent believing soul awaken a passion of reverence and humility passing expression.

SPENSER B. MEESER.

The Kingdom of God. THOMAS H. HICKMAN. Boston: The Gorham Press. Richard G. Badger.

HERE is a volume proposing a comprehensive view of that oft-debated something, the kingdom of God. In three parts which raise and answer the questions: Where is it, What is it, and How to bring it to pass? The where of it is answered by the terms Present and Personal, within you; Present and Social, on earth among men; Eternal, completed in heaven. It is a kingdom of purity and love; of faith and service; of truth and intelligence; of honesty and righteousness; of mercy, kindness, and prosperity; of peace, health, and happiness. It is to be brought to pass through the evangelization of the unevangelized area of our own lives, of the homeland, and of the social order.

The author seems to have included about all the aspects of the discussion, though his work is not given to debate on the matter. The series of chapters would make a good series of sermons, and the work will be very suggestive as one in which to include a wide variety of ethical teachings and worth-while exhortations. Apt quotations, terse sentences of

value, and suggestive thoughts are frequent. The volume is a wholesome exposition of the theme in many aspects, and one is rather relieved to find no rancorous debate or cynical aspersions on those who may have other views.

SPENSER B. MEESER.

Rogues of the Bible. JAMES BLACK. New York: Harper and Brothers.

THIS book by Dr. James Black is very readable indeed. Its suggestiveness alone will commend it to ministers who have weekly preparation of sermon material to gather. But from the point of view of sheer interest it may be read with pleasure by the reading public in general.

A new appraisement is offered on behalf of many Biblical characters who have been but partly understood by Bible readers. In Doctor Black's words, he presents "the case for the defense." Not that he hopes to prove any of them guiltless. But he presents many interesting view-points which greatly mitigate their offenses or crimes.

Its style and form are in keeping with the author's high standards in other writings.

GEORGE F. FINNIE.

Phantom Walls. SIR OLIVER LODGE. London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1929. Pp. xiii, 251.

OUR universe in its material form is a "phantom wall" through which spiritual reality is seeking to express itself. It is difficult to get expression —in fact, it gets very fragmentary expression—on account of the apparently rigid and physical nature of matter. Man is made for the superior sphere of being, and for that reason is constantly exercising his highest faculties to penetrate the mailed cloak of the invisible and abiding. Today, two sources of investigation are proving fruitful means of discovery, the new physics and spiritualism. Sir Oliver Lodge is not only a prominent physicist, but he has won distinction as an investigator of spiritualistic phenomena. This most recent book from his study is a setting forth of the latest discoveries in these independent spheres of learning to substantiate his faith in the superiority of "mind" over "matter" and in the survival of the human spirit after the death of the mortal body.

In the use of scientific data, Sir Oliver is one with Eddington, Jeans, and Einstein in denying the orthodox view of matter (materialism) that held the loyalty of most physicists a generation ago. "By the physical we mean something more than merely matter. . . Many physical things (light, magnetism, etc.) are not material." He claims for the "ether-wave" theory of physics, which his contemporaries hold, a strong degree of justifi-

cation. Ether seems to be the *tertium quid* that bridges the gulf between thinking and thing in experience. From this point of view the physical is too difficult of apprehension to be represented adequately by simple language. Only the most abstract mathematical formulæ picture the character of the atom and its constituent forces. However, the denial of permanent "substance" form to sense objects and the ascription of less tangible and more flexible properties to them, leave the author free to argue for the kinship of matter to spirit, and therefore for the validity of the *summum bonum* of religion.

But as concerned as the writer is to fortify religion with the findings of science, he is more desirous to commend spiritualism to open-minded seekers for the whole truth about life. A considerable summary of supposedly trustworthy data given by "mediums" in seances is offered to prove the uninterrupted life of the departed and their ability to get into communication with their terrestrial relatives. For instance, it is adduced that memory, intellect, and the whole personality continue after death, with the possibility of individual growth in knowledge and character. As far as the nature of their environment has been revealed, it is much the same in quality as here: they are in the same universe as we. The "vicious" are not associated with ordinary inhabitants in post-mortem existence, for provision is made for diversity of tastes, interests, and powers of self-expression. A person may progress or regress in cultural attainment as he chooses. The review of celestial traits reads very much like those that are entertained in many Christian circles. However, much a reader may discount the interpretation of events which Sir Oliver has given, it remains for him to recognize the mysterious phenomena that do actually assert themselves under the conditions the author treats. There is an area of experience for further inquiry, and the author can hardly be claimed to dogmatize about its significance, however strongly he entertains convictions. Waiving for the moment the legitimacy of such investigation and the natural human appeal that prompts it, may it not be that such scholars as Lodge are motivated somewhat in their inquiry by a desire to satisfy an instinctive wish for cosmic security of soul, fraught as men are with so much danger and uncertainty in this earthly journey? If so, may they not be in danger of overstressing the cogency of certain arguments common to their group, and also of reading into obscure phenomena, associated with "mediums," meanings that satisfy this wish rather than all the facts?

STEWART G. COLE.

Miscellaneous Notes on Old Testament Topics. Barnard C. Taylor. Philadelphia: The Judson Press. 1929. Pp. 100. $1.25.

This volume is just what it pretends to be, namely "Notes," and they are suggestive notes. Doctor Taylor writes as he teaches, in very concise and terse phrase, hence the brief compass of one hundred pages scarcely tells the whole about the content.

The message of the book is presented under three general divisions: Miscellaneous Notes, Kingdom of God, and Homiletical Suggestions. The first named claims three-quarters of the volume, and deals with seventy-two topics which range from "Importance of the Old Testament," "Antiquity of Man," and "Date and Authorship of the Pentateuch," to "The Captivity of Israel," "Didactic Purpose of Punishment," and "The Significance of the Sabbath." The Kingdom of God is studied as presented first by the Old Testament, then by the New, while Homiletic Suggestions deal particularly with Jeremiah, the Minor Prophets, and the Psalms.

The author, formerly an esteemed teacher of the reviewer, writes as a healthful conservative in Biblical matters; naturally therefore this little book will best serve the conservative student.

William R. McNutt.

The Child in the Congregation. Jay T. Stocking. Boston and Chicago: The Pilgrim Press. 1929. Pp. 114. $1.50.

Here are sparks from the anvil; such a volume always has a real ministry, provided the workman is somewhat of a master. Doctor Stocking reveals himself to be all that in this big volume in small compass. He is an artist, as the twelve sermons to children make plain. The constructive sections have a note of authority as they deal with "The Children's Pulpit," "The Children's World," and "The Children's Decalogue," in other words the Why? What? and How? of preaching to children. We heartily commend this book to him who would better minister to the children of his parish; it is a treasure-chest bearing much of the gold refined by experience.

William R. McNutt.

Must We Have War? Fred B. Smith, Chairman Executive Committee World Alliance for International Friendship Through the Churches. With a Foreword by Owen D. Young. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1929. Pp. xv, 318.

This might not unfairly be described as materials for a book, rather than a book. Which is the same thing as saying that the author's industry and flair for facts greatly exceed his power to assimilate, organize, and express his facts. It is well worth careful reading, for the value of the contained

facts. It is unnecessarily difficult reading, for the author's lack of literary skill. This lack betrays itself everywhere, but is perhaps especially annoying as it manifests itself in the frequent misuse of words, such as, "Britains" for "Britons" and "fomentation" for "fermentation." Sentences often do not "hang together," as "The percentage of the people of the United States who have or will make such a voyage is exceedingly small." The style throughout is that of a newspaper reporter, and not a very good one at that.

The content, as already implied, is excellent. The discussion gives us all the documented and documentary facts a reasonable reader can demand. For reference purposes it will serve as well as an unindexed book can be expected to do. Any one who buys the book will do well to make for himself as he reads a penciled index on the back fly-leaves, of which the publishers have mercifully provided several.

Mr. Smith points out very clearly what our country may and should do to promote international harmony and the ultimate triumph of world peace. He does full justice to the difficulties and dangers ahead of the nations, but without becoming a mere alarmist. One of the best things that he does is to stress the service that organized religion can do toward making a warless world.

Some of the opinions that the author expresses may fail to gain the assent of all readers, but they are worth pondering before one rejects them. Among such one might mention the section on "Freedom of the Seas" (pp. 172-176), and that on "Geographical Jealousies" (pp. 188-197). And finally, this is worthy of consideration by all of us: "Every genuine peace advocate ought to be investing some money for the extension of the movement." All of us are ready to talk peace; some say they would be willing to fight for it; how many are ready to give something to procure it?

HENRY C. VEDDER.

The Story of David Livingstone. W. P. LIVINGSTONE. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1930. Pp. 161. Price, $1.50.

THE author of *Mary Slessor of Calabar,* now in its thirty-fourth edition, has rendered another splendid service in producing his vivid account of the life and labors of the greatest of African explorers and missionaries.

Omitting nothing essential, yet not going into details which might be wearisome, the book presents the vital spirit of David Livingstone, and retells, in a fascinating way, the story which remains "a continuous inspiration in its revelation of the power and dignity and possibilities of the human soul."

RITTENHOUSE NEISSER.

What Is the Mind? GEORGE THOMAS WHITE PATRICK, Ph. D. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1929. Pp. 185. Price, $2.50.

NO MORE fascinating question may be proposed than appears in the title of this book. At a time when the physicist seems on the verge of discovering the essential nature of matter and the biologist of learning what life is, it is not strange that the psychologist should be bending his energies to the solution of what is probably the greatest problem of all.

Early in this discussion mind is defined as "the name of that kind of behavior by which living beings adjust themselves and adapt themselves to their physical and social environment." By "living being" is meant "an organic whole, a unit, an individual." Consciousness is not regarded as a synonym for mind: it is simply awareness. Self-consciousness "is the awareness of one's self in one's interrelations." Mind and self are not the same, for the former represents the activities and the latter the actor. "The self is the minded body, the living individual," with his needs and capacities.

While radical behaviorism is rejected, mind is regarded as an activity, and, since reality is found in happenings as well as in elements the mind "partakes of the very nature of reality." The organism of which mind is an activity is described as a unitary complex, by which is meant "a complex which itself behaves as a unit and in which all the parts are influenced by the pattern of the whole."

"The total of reality" the author says,

> is constantly enlarged and enriched by the new qualities and new modes of behavior which arise from the organization of elements or complexes of a lower grade into complexes of a higher grade. The human mind is such an enlargement and enrichment of reality, and cannot be analyzed into any combination of physical or physiological elements.

The sharp contrast between body and mind made in some theories is considered unnecessary. "The mind is something the body achieves, or which is achieved through the body, by means of the creative forces of evolution." Mental evolution does not mean that the mind of man has been "evolved *out* of animal behavior." "It is something new and wonderful."

The chapter on the Evolution of the Mind, in which the Darwin theory is carefully criticized, reaches this conclusion:

> Provisionally evolution may be defined as a process of organization, tending to increased complexity and integration, and to increased definiteness and stability, issuing evermore in new structures, each with its characteristic reaction, thus giving to the world new qualities, new powers and new modes of action, all leading to

increased control and enlarged freedom. The human body is such a new structure and the human mind is such a new power and mode of action.

Mechanistic theories are discarded in view of the fact that " evolution seems more like the action of formative forces struggling for expression."

After an appreciative discussion of the contribution toward the solution of the problem of organization in the philosophy of evolution made by Aristotle, Bergson, McDougall, and Lloyd Morgan, two conclusions are presented.

The first is that there are certain formative forces at work in the world and that organization is the product of these forces and not of chance groupings of inert elements.

The second conclusion is that these formative forces issue in organisms of higher and higher order, each with new powers, capacities, and qualitative differences, till finally we arrive at that highly organized and highly integrated complex which we call the living human individual, with its capacity for ordered planning and conscious control.

To this ordered planning and conscious control, this intelligent and adaptive behavior, we give the name mind, and this is the daily meaning of the term. Thus mind is apical, not fundamental. That is, it stands at the end, not at the beginning, of the evolutionary process. It is a value realized. But we must not forget that mind in its broadest sense includes also those impulses, interests, and purposive strivings which give to life its zest and meaning.

This hasty review does scant justice to the volume under consideration. Its clearness of style, comprehensiveness, and ability to retain the interest of the reader make it well deserve its place in the " Philosophy for the Laymen Series."

RITTENHOUSE NEISSER.

Later Baptist Missionaries and Pioneers. Volume II. WALTER SINCLAIR STEWART. Philadelphia: The Judson Press. 1929. Pp. 266. Price, $1.50 net.

THIS is the final volume of the second group of a series of four books in which are assembled the life-stories of thirty-five Baptist missionaries. Nine of these brief biographies appear in the present work, and cover the lives of such pioneers as Zachary C. Taylor, of Brazil, and Captain Luke Bickel, of Japan.

Dr. William A. Hill, secretary of the Department of Missionary Education, regards this series as of rare value, especially suited for use in summer assemblies, young people's societies, mission-study classes, and reading courses.

RITTENHOUSE NEISSER.

BOOKS RECEIVED

Couriers of Courage. WILLIAM RUSSELL OWEN. Nashville, Tenn.: Sunday School Board of Southern Baptist Convention.

THE publishers announce this volume with the following commendation:

> This versatile author is at his best in this attractive collection. Doctor Owen combines as few men can spiritual truth, moral strength, and dynamic presentation; he is particularly happy in the use of illustration. This brief volume, for instance, contains some one hundred illustrations and thirty-five quotable poems. Those who like to mix pleasure with profit in their reading will enjoy these messages.

William Russell Owen is an alumnus of Crozer in the class of 1904. He has also published other volumes.

Under Head-Hunters' Eyes. ALVA C. BOWERS. Philadelphia: The Judson Press.

AFTER more than twenty-five years as a missionary in Assam Mr. Bowers has something worth while to say.

The book is a colorful motion-picture of Assam, showing the background of the country and the people, the history and the present-day industrial, social, and practical conditions against which missionary methods are projected.

Child of the Sun. CORDIE WEBB INGRAM. Nashville, Tenn.: Sunday School Board of Southern Baptist Convention.

A STORY of a very talented and charming young woman who found her highest joy in carrying into her daily contacts and opportunities the very obvious but generally ignored teachings of Jesus. With the background of a typical Texas community, the author draws rather vivid pictures of characters known to many and transforms through the agency of a radiant girl the drab existence of even those who live in the commonplace.

Missions Our Mission. M. E. DODD, D. D. Sunday School Board of Southern Baptist Convention.

THE object of this book is to show that the entire denominational Cooperative Program is one, and that the aim of it all is the preaching of the Gospel. This program includes orphans' homes, hospitals, ministerial relief, education, state, home, and foreign missions. The book may be used for study classes.

The Gospel Among the Red Men. ROBERT HAMILTON. Nashville, Tenn.: Sunday School Board of the Southern Baptist Convention.

FROM books most of which are out of print, from letters and diaries, from Government bulletins, and from the yellowed pages of pioneer histories this story has come. It is perhaps the only history of Baptist missions to the Indians in the South.

Bible Briefs Against Hurtful Heresies. H. BOYCE TAYLOR, SR. Murray, Ky.: News and Truths.

A SOMEWHAT uncritical grouping of Bible texts aimed at Campbellites, Hardshellism, Holy Rollers, Seventh-Dayists, Ku Klux, Catholics, etc. (Pamphlet.)

The Gospel of Jesus Christ. MISS L. L. ROBINSON. Milwaukee, Wis.: Morehouse Publishing Company.

A SMALL pamphlet well illustrated, containing a brief outline of the life of Jesus, made of selections from the Gospels. Handy size for enclosure in ordinary business envelope.